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Cyber-infrastructure systems are integrated  large-scale  IT systems designed with the goal  of 
transforming scientific practice by enabling multi-disciplinary, cross-institutional collaboration. 
Their  large  scale  and socio-technical  complexity  make design  decisions  for  their  underlying 
architecture practically irreversible. Drawing on three alternative theories of IT adoption (path 
dependence, project management, technology framing) and on a qualitative study of archival and 
interview data I examine how design and development influence the adoption trajectory of four 
competing  cyber-infrastructure  systems  comprising  the  Global  Environment  for  Network 
Innovations (www.geni.net) over a period of ten years (2001-2011). 
Findings indicate that a) early design decisions, particularly those related to similar pre-
existing systems set a path of adoption in motion leading to the early dominance of one system, 
b) coordination of milestones led to increased adoption for the high-performing teams, and c) the 
framing of technology presentations and demos as a social influence strategy was less effective 
in “breaking” the dominant system’s adoption path in the long term but enabled most of the 
development teams to challenge that dominance and increase the adoption of their systems in the 
short term. While studies in path dependence and dominant design assume that adoption and 
dominance occurs through users’ actions after development is completed, this study’s findings 
show that developers and managers of competing systems can also influence adoption and even 
“break” the dominant system’s adoption path while it’s still under development. Understanding 
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how cyber-infrastructure systems are developed is key to promoting their adoption and use. This 
research has import for understanding the ramifications of early-stage design decisions, as well 
as the impact of project coordination and technology presentation strategies such as framing for 
the adoption of such systems.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The nature of large-scale research projects, the need to draw experts from multiple fields, and the 
need to produce innovative research outcomes have led to the formation of multi-disciplinary 
research  groups  that  often  span  institutional,  disciplinary  and  communities-of-practice 
boundaries. Large scale cyber-infrastructure (CI) systems or collaboratories are being deployed 
to  support  such  research  efforts  (Olson  2008).  Cyber-infrastructure  has  been  defined  as 
“infrastructure based upon distributed computer, information, and communication technology” 
(Atkins et.  al 2003). There is also increased involvement on the part of industry experts and 
practitioners;  university  research  centers  are  forming  partnerships  with  the  practitioner 
community while deploying an IS infrastructure to support joint research projects (e.g., Lohr 
2007). 
The deployment of cyber-infrastructure systems often constitutes an innovation in the 
research community in which they are introduced because such systems involve changes in the 
way that research activities have been traditionally structured in offline environments, and for 
that reason their value is less obvious to potential users. For example, contributing and reusing 
other  researchers’  raw  data,  and  making  progress  and  evaluation  reports  accessible  to  all 
members with access to the system are practices that are not traditionally part of researchers’ 
work norms. The cyber-infrastructure makes them possible on a large scale but unless users can 
foresee and recognize the value of those practices, they will not be motivated to use an IS that 
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requires them to overcome the inertia of long held practices and change the way they conduct 
their work. Moreover, the value of a cyber-infrastructure lies not only in the data and technical 
support  it  can provide  but  also in  the  fact  that  there  are  sufficient  users,  a  critical  mass  of 
adopters, to contribute data and knowledge resources. The innovative nature of such systems, the 
high  costs  of  development  and  maintenance  that  they  require,  and  the  fact  that  their  value 
depends on having a critical  mass of contributors of data and other resources all  make their 
adoption and diffusion challenging, both for individual scientists and their organizations.
The adoption and diffusion of technology has been examined in the IS literature,  but 
those  studies  involved  organizational  or  corporate  systems  whose  users  were  subject  to  a 
common organizational culture, rewards structure and policies. Common organizational norms 
and  culture  affect  whether  the  system  is  seen  as  valuable  and  beneficial  by  organizational 
members. Large scale cyberinfrastructures, however, span organizational boundaries and are not 
subject to a single set of work norms. Potential users in the community will tend to have different 
backgrounds  and  expectations  about  the  system,  as  well  as  different  priorities  and  goals 
associated with their being employed and affiliated with different organizations.
The present study is a comparative examination of four cyber-infrastructure systems and 
the processes underlying the emergence of a dominant technology. Chapters 2 and 3 provide 
some background on the development of cyber-infrastructure systems and a literature review 
with hypotheses about the emergence of a dominant design in such systems. Chapter 4 describes 
the site of this research, Chapter 5 describes the methods used to test the hypotheses, Chapter 6 
discusses the results of the hypothesis testing, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the results 
for researchers and practitioners and Chapter 8 is a conclusion of this study.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
The development of CI systems tends to follow one of three high-level design paradigms. One of 
them is grid computing, which involves centrally organized and owned supercomputing clusters 
that are connected by dedicated, high-bandwidth networks. Grid systems support “coordinated 
resource sharing among dynamic collections of individuals, institutions… and geographically  
distributed hardware, software, and information resources” (Foster and Kesselman 2001). Grid-
based systems are built  on an underlying architecture that  supports the participating labs’ or 
universities’ subsystems such as the Open Grid Services Architecture (Foster et al. 2002). 
A  competing  paradigm  is  that  of  public-resource  or  peer-to-peer  networks,  with 
supercomputing  resources  being decentralized  and distributed  depending on the  participating 
users’ capacity to support and share resources (Foster and Kesselman 1997). An example of 
peer-to-peer infrastructure is SETI@Home which is based on user-configurable applications that 
run in parallel and are managed in a decentralized fashion (Anderson et al. 2002).Those two 
paradigms for CI systems are considered to be irreconcilable; Grid-based middleware cannot be 
easily deployed for public-resource computing (Foster and Kesselman 1997). Grid computing is 
based on a symmetric relationship between participating users and institutions: participants can 
either share or use resources, whereas the peer-to-peer networks impose an asymmetry between 
providers of resources and those using them: participating users and institutions are required to 
share  each  others’  computing  resources  in  order  to  be  able  to  use  the  network’s  resources. 
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Joining a peer-to-peer network is often at the discretion of individual users whereas joining a 
grid network is determined by the institutions supporting the research lab or project with which 
the users are affiliated. 
A  third  paradigm  is  that  of  cloud  computing  which  refers  to  service-oriented 
supercomputing  resources  that  can  be  accessed  and  utilized  over  the  Internet.  The  cloud 
computing infrastructure resides in large data centers and is usually managed by a third party 
(Jaeger et al 2008; Hand 2007). An example of cloud-computing infrastructure is the Google-
IBM Academic  Cloud Computing  Initiative  (Lohr  2007).  Cloud infrastructures  are  designed 
around  market-oriented  incentives  for  participation  and  utilization  of  the  cloud’s  resources 
(Buyya et al. 2008). Users, whether individuals or institutions,  purchase or lease access to the 
cloud’s computing resources for a limited period of time, and pricing is determined based on the 
intensity and scope of the computational resources that they are accessing. The organization of 
the  resources  under  a  cloud  vs.  a  grid  architecture  still  represent  different  models  for  data 
management (data is distributed in the cloud vs. distributed among remote and local academic 
sites  in  grid  and peer-to-peer  computing)  and also  for  resource  utilization  (market-based or 
partnership-based incentives with cloud computing vs. academic consortia and community-based 
incentives with grid and peer-to-peer computing). 
In addition to those three design paradigms that are primarily technical, the design space 
for  CI  systems  is  also  characterized  by  different  disciplinary  paradigms  depending  on  the 
scientific and computer science disciplines that develop and use the CI system. CI systems are 
developed largely by research scientists and reflect models and ideas that are prevalent in IT and 
computer science at the time that the CI is built, but might not be shared or valued by the domain 
scientists that are the intended users. An example is the tension between experimentation and 
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production-oriented  systems.  The  logic  of  production  systems  emphasizes  system reliability, 
stability,  and efficient  development  methodologies.  The logic of experimentation emphasizes 
research-oriented development, the use of experimental methods, and implementation of open-
ended architectures. Experimentation takes precedence over concerns about stability, reliability 
and  efficiency.  Domain  scientists  that  are  the  intended  users  of  a  given  CI  tend  to  prefer 
production-oriented designs whereas computer scientists and IT experts that are charged with 
developing the CI tend to value experimental designs. 
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3.0 RESEARCH PROBLEM
The various design paradigms for CI systems tend to be irreconcilable  with each other,  and 
switching between functionalities that represent different paradigms is impractical. The selection 
of a particular design for CI systems is more often than not too costly to reverse,  both in terms 
of financial cost (total development cost for CIs range in millions of dollars) and in terms of the 
coordination costs associated with design decisions made by multiple experts and stakeholders. 
Even though peripheral functionality and software can be added onto the system at various points 
after  it  is  built,  the  underlying  architecture  and  design  paradigm  of  the  CI  are  not  easily 
modifiable. Technical interoperability issues and social sources of conflict among stakeholders 
that might make them unwilling to share and reuse data and the tools and services embedded in a 
CI once it is built. The irreversible nature of CI systems increase the risk of decisions regarding 
their design, while the diversity of users, developers and organizations that have a stake in the CI 
system increase the social complexity of design decisions.
Practically, the challenge in the development of CI systems is the selection of a design 
that can serve multiple constituencies while assuming a particular form and structure that will 
invariably  be  too  costly  to  replace.  Theoretically,  the  research  problem associated  with  this 
practical challenge is explicating the process by which a CI design is selected or emerges as a 
function of the social dynamics among stakeholders, predicting how the design selection process 
will unfold and what will likely drive the selection of a particular design. The goal of this study 
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is to examine the process by which a dominant design emerges for the architecture of a cyber-
infrastructure system. To that end, the following research questions will be examined:
RQ1: Why does a technology design achieve dominance over another?
RQ2: What are the behavioral factors that explain why a design dominates others?
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4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1.1 The development of cyber-infrastructure systems
Cyber-infrastructure projects are complex socio-technical projects focused on the development 
of integrated hardware and software for the purposes of supporting and transforming scientific 
research  (Olson  et  al.  2008).  Scientific  collaboration  –  the  sharing  of  tools,  data  and  other 
resources that support knowledge generation - has become “essential  to researchers” (Lucio-
Arias and Leydesdorff  2009).  Advanced computing infrastructures make possible the use of 
digital technologies that expand scientists’ research capabilities (e.g., use of visualization and 
simulation software) and are also changing the nature of the projects and research questions that 
scientists pursue. In the MIS literature, the field of cyber-infrastructure studies is relatively new, 
as such systems have only recently become common in areas such as the natural  and health 
sciences,  and  less  so  in  the  social  sciences.  Below  is  a  review  of  recent  studies  of  CI 
development.
Studies of cyber-infrastructure development have followed two approaches. Some studies 
have  focused  on  socio-technical  issues  such  as  system  breakdowns,  how  individuals  and 
institutions  respond  when  the  development  efforts  don’t  go  as  planned,  how  scientists, 
developers  and  other  stakeholders  of  a  cyber-infrastructure  system  align  their  interests  and 
priorities  and coordinate  the  development  effort.  Such an  approach,  focusing  on design  and 
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development  activities  has  been termed infrastructural  inversion  (Bowker  1994),  because  its 
focus  is  on  those  activities  that  constitute  and  support  the  creation  and  functioning  of 
infrastructure.   A second approach has been that  of examining activities  that that  the cyber-
infrastructure supports, such as conducting scientific work, sharing data, collaborating remotely 
with other scientists, etc. This second approach differs in that it takes the development of the 
cyber-infrastructure  system as  a  starting  point,  or  as  a  given,  and  focuses  instead  on  what 
happens after the system has been funded, designed, developed and adopted by scientists. Below 
is a review of studies that have followed each of those two approaches, followed by a description 
of the present study’s approach.
Studies that follow the first approach, of infrastructural inversion, include Bietz et al. 
2010; Kee and Browning 2010; Faniel and Jacobsen 2010; Karasti et al, 2010; Kirsch et al, 2009. 
Karasti  et  al.  (2010) look at  issues  of  conflict  among developers  and information  managers 
during the development of a metadata language. Theirs is a study of two CI systems:  the Long-
Term Ecological Research Network (LTER Network) and the National Center for Ecological 
Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS).  LTER was designed to support comparative research across 
sites and ecosystems and among other related research programs, in the US and internationally. 
The NCEAS uses existing information to address important questions in ecology and related 
disciplines.  Karasti  et  al  (2010)  conducted  a  longitudinal  study and  identified  two temporal 
development  orientations:  project  orientation  and  infrastructure  orientation.  For  example, 
developers  with  a  project  orientation  tend  to  focus  on  meeting  of  deadlines  of  short-term 
projects, while information managers with an infrastructure orientation aim to provide a reliable 
information  environment  and  resources.  The  study  shows  how  these  two  orientations, 
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“infrastructure  time”  and  “continuing  design”,  can  be  useful  in  settings  of  long-term 
collaborative infrastructure development. 
Kee and Browning (2010) explore funding issues in  cyber-infrastructure  development 
and trace their emergence at the institutional, individual, and ideological levels. Their study is 
based  on  the  TeraGrid,  an  open  scientific  discovery  infrastructure  with  resources  at  eleven 
partner sites that aims to create an integrated computational environment. Kee and Browning 
(2010)  show  how  cyber-infrastructure  development  is  supported  by  a  range  of  institutions, 
individuals,  and  ideologies.  Moreover,  the  study  identified  tensions  in  the  development  of 
TeraGrid, on the three levels of institutions, individuals, and ideologies. At the institutional level, 
the tensions include: funding either science or the development of technology; and juggling the 
priorities  of NSF and local  states,  home universities,  and federal  agencies.  At the individual 
level,  the  tensions  are:   providing either  unrewarded service  to  the  scientific  community  or 
building  a  tenure  case;  and  spending  time  both  on  virtual  organizations  and  a  local 
supercomputer center.  At the ideological level,  there is one tension of developing the cyber-
infrastructure  system  either  for  one’s  theory/methodology  or  for  one’s  competitors’ 
theory/methodology.
Bietz et al. (2010) introduced the concept of synergizing to highlight the collaborative 
strategies in building and maintaining productive relationships among scientists, organizations, 
and technologies that are part of a certain cyber-infrastructure system. Their study is based on the 
Community  Cyber-infrastructure  for  Advanced  Marine  Microbial  ecology  Research  and 
Analysis (CAMERA), which serves the needs of the microbial ecology research community by 
creating a data repository and bioinformatics tools. The study identified embeddedness as a key 
characteristic of cyber-infrastructure development, in the sense that the cyber-infrastructure is 
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“sunk” or embedded into other structures, social arrangements, and technologies. Embeddedness 
is  not  only a  result  of developing cyber-infrastructure,  but  is  also an important  resource for 
development activities.
Kirsch et al. (2009) examined issues of conflict during the development of the Network 
for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) from the perspective of faultlines. Faultlines are 
hypothetical attributes (such as professional affiliation, gender, or expertise) that divide groups, 
and potentially trigger conflict within and between them (Lau and Murnighan 1998). NEES is 
comprised of 14 experimental facilities,  collaborative tools, a centralized data repository, and 
earthquake simulation software. The study followed the development of NEES over the course of 
six years and found that conflict among developers, scientists and the funding agency was the 
result  of  faultlines  that  formed  due  to  deep diversity  issues  between  stakeholders,  mistaken 
assumptions about technology capabilities and misperceptions of who is a stakeholder in the 
cyber-infrastructure’s development.
Studies that follow the second approach, taking the development of the CI system as a 
given and focusing instead on activities it supports, include de la Flor et al. (2010); Monteiro, 
2010; and Faniel and Jacobsen (2010). More specifically, de la Flor et al. (2010) examined the 
Virtual Research Environment for the Study of Documents and Manuscripts (VRE-SDM), which 
was a pilot project designed to address the user needs of documentary, textual and manuscript 
scholars.  The  study  focused  on  the  function  of  CI  tools  and  techniques  in  promoting  the 
development of new forms of scientific practices and collaboration by embedding technologies 
within research institutes.  De la Flor et  al  (2010) showed how a CI application can support 
scientific collaboration and emphasized how crucial it is for CI systems to adequately support 
large-scale collaboration among remotely distributed researchers. 
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Monteiro  (2010)  demonstrated  how  scientists  working  in  a  multidisciplinary  team 
produce  scientific  evidence  through  the  use  of  scientific  visualizations.  Advanced  imaging 
technologies as a type of CI application were used by the scientists to produce computer models 
of heat transfer in living tissues. The study shows that scientists derive observations from digital 
objects, which they consider to be part of what is ‘empirical’ to their work. Scientific evidence is 
produced not only through observation of natural objects, but also through scientists’ use of and 
interaction  with  digital  objects.  The  use  of  cyber-infrastructure  systems  is  thus  changing 
scientists’ notions of what counts as empirical evidence. Monteiro (2010) thus demonstrates the 
important function of CI systems in enabling and altering scientists’ work and in changing the 
meaning  of  CI  tools  and  systems  as  a  “third  pillar  of  science”  (in  addition  to  theory  and 
observation).
In another study of NEES (Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation), Faniel and 
Jacobsen  (2010)  examined  how  earthquake  engineering  researchers  reuse  colleagues’ 
experimental scientific data. While scientists have traditionally assessed the reusability of small 
scale scientific data by looking at the data’s relevance,  trustworthiness and intelligibility,  the 
emergence of cyber-infrastructure systems has enabled the collection and reuse of large-scale 
data. That means that in order to assess the large-scale data’s reusability in the same way that the 
reusability  of  smaller-scale  data  is  assessed,  CI  systems  will  need  to  provide  specific 
technological capabilities to those producing the data and to those reusing it. For example, as 
Faniel and Jacobsen (2010) discuss, CI systems will need to include documentation tools, visual 
representations and contextual information that help scientists not only produce and document 
their own data but also assess and reuse their colleagues’ data.
12
As the above studies indicate, scientists rely on the ability of CI systems to support the 
production  of  scientific  evidence  (Monteiro,  2010),  scientists’  short-term  and  long-term 
information  needs  (Karasti  et  al.  2010),  remote  collaboration  (de  la  Flor  et  al  2010), 
interdisciplinary collaboration and career advancement (Kirsch et al. 2009; Bietz et al. 2010; Kee 
and Browning 2010), and data reuse (Faniel and Jacobsen 2010). For those reasons, it is crucial 
to understand how the design, development, and deployment of CI systems unfolds with the goal 
of identifying successful practices and interventions that can ensure that the CI system meets the 
different needs of its stakeholders. 
4.1.2 The Emergence of Dominant Design(s)
The literature on IT adoption, diffusion and innovation discusses the development of IT 
designs with the metaphor of “dominant design”. An IT design can be a technology, a standard, a 
format,  or  a  design  concept  (Abernathy  and  Utterback  1978).  A  dominant  design  for  a 
technology “emerges” out of a number of competing alternatives when it gains wide acceptance 
by developers, users, or consumers at the exclusion of its alternatives. Dominant designs, once 
they are established in an industry or field,  can be extended and modified incrementally  but 
cannot be readily substituted nor integrated with their alternatives.  Further, dominant designs 
have  been conceptualized  as  primarily  technological  innovations  that  are  selected  over  their 
alternatives not because of their superior functionality but through processes of social influence 
and market selection (Utterback 1996). Some studies emphasize the path- dependent nature of 
the development and adoption of IT systems, and tend to assume that alternative designs are 
available in the market that can be evaluated by their potential adopters (Tushman and Murmann 
1998). 
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Overall,  the  IT  adoption  and  innovation  literature  has  examined  the  emergence  of 
“dominant  designs” for systems that  are  relatively homogenous,  stand-alone technologies,  or 
easily  unbundled  into  their  complements.  CI  systems  differ  in  that  they  are  a  collection  of 
heterogenous technologies, which must be integrated and interoperate for the CI system to be 
considered as such, and cannot be easily unbundled into their components. Moreover, designs in 
the IT diffusion and innovation literature tend to be conceptualized as static, having a fixed set of 
functionality and features. CI designs can be static or dynamic, incomplete and evolving during 
the process of their “selection” by users. A dominant design emerges as a function of critical 
mass of adopters (Arthur 1989), however, that is tractable only after the technology is built and 
users have adopted or rejected it.  Dominant CI designs on the other hand, tend to consist of 
abstract models, prototypes, and incomplete and evolving specifications. A CI design is likely to 
dominate  users’  preferences  before  it  is  completely  built.  Users  are  less  likely  to  have  had 
experience  with  systems  of  similar  reach  (embedded  in  work  practices)  and  scope 
(accommodating multiple scientific communities) and might not have the benefit of trial with a 
system when evaluating alternatives. The differences between the kinds of IT designs examined 
in the IT adoption and innovation literature and the characteristics of CI designs imply that the 
process by which a CI design becomes dominant over competing designs might be different from 
what the literature on non-CI designs suggests. Different factors might be influential at different 
points in time leading up to the emergence of a particular design. 
Table 1 summarizes  the differences  in how adoption and diffusion of technology has 
been typically studied in (non-cyber-infrastructure) information systems development projects as 
opposed to cyber-infrastructure development projects.
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Table 1. Adoption and Diffusion in Traditional vs. Cyber-infrastructure Systems
IS Development  Projects Cyber-infrastructure Development 
Projects
Nature of  IT 
adoption /diffusion
Individuals or 
organizations adopt a 
completely developed 
organizational system or 
end-user application.
Individuals or organizations form a 
consortium or a network of multiple research 
labs and adopt an incomplete system, shared 
by members of the consortium. The CI 
system is being developed as users join the 
consortium or research network.
Nature of the IT 
system
Complete, stand-alone 
software system or 
application, might 
interoperate with other 
systems.
Incomplete, complex combination of inter-
related software and hardware, must 
interoperate with each other to be part of the 
CI system. CI system includes data center(s), 
large scale databases, equipment related to 
the users/scientists’ work.
System users Organizations in an 
industry and their 
employees, end-users / 
consumers of IT products.
Research scientists and their employing 
institutions, typically university departments 
and labs, from various disciplines.
Measures of 
adoption/diffusion
Number of users / buyers 
of a certain IT product, 
market share of an IT 
system compared to 
competing systems.
Number of institutions, research labs or 
departments joining the cyber-infrastructure 
consortium or network. Number of research 
projects using the CI system.
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4.2 ANTECEDENTS TO THE EMERGENCE OF DOMINANT DESIGN(S)
There are three alternative explanations in the IS and organizational literatures that might explain 
how an IT system achieves dominance over competing alternatives. The goal of the present study 
is to examine the fit of each theory regarding the adoption / dominance of cyber-infrastructure 
systems.  The  study  will  contribute  to  the  research  field  of  cyber-infrastructure  studies  by 
identifying social processes driving the adoption /dominance of such systems in the presence of 
competing alternatives.  The site of the present study is a network or program of four cyber-
infrastructure systems, comprising GENI (www.geni.net). The four CI systems were funded by 
the NSF, and are competing for becoming the definitive design for the overall GENI system. 
Initial funding and design of all four CI systems began in 2007 and continues until the time of 
the study. Moreover, all four CI systems have a common management structure, with the same 
management team (the GENI Project Management Office) overseeing their development efforts. 
That common context and the competing nature of the four system’s relationship makes GENI an 
appropriate site for a comparative study of multiple CI systems and their adoption trajectories 
over time. The three theories from the literature that might explain differences in their adoption 
and dominance are discussed in greater detail below.
4.2.1 Path Dependence
Path dependence theory stresses the importance of past  events for future action.  Current and 
future events, actions or decisions depend on the path of previous events actions, or decisions. 
Sydow et al (2009) define path dependence as a rigidified, potentially inefficient action pattern 
built up by the unintended consequences of former decisions and positive feedback processes. 
16
That means that for an organization’s history or development to be considered path-dependent, 
there must exist a sequence (or path) of events, decisions or other developments that indicate a 
narrowing or constriction of choices in that organization’s development. Those choices can be 
decision alternatives, choices in the organization’s management, or any other kind of options that 
are available to members of that organization at the beginning of its history and which over time 
constrict  into  a  progressively narrower set  of  choices.  Eventually  a  path emerges  out  of the 
narrow  set  of  choices  that  links  together  key  events,  decisions  or  activities  so  that  the 
organization’s development or history can be considered path-dependent.
Studies of path dependence model path-dependent processes as adoption patterns: social 
actors adopt technologies, standards or make decisions, and some of this adoption paths end up 
dominating others, eventually resulting in lock-in. For example, the adoption of the QWERTY 
keyboard design is considered path-dependent (David 1985). The more users that adopted the 
QWERTY  keyboard,  the  more  likely  it  was  that  prospective  users  would  also  choose  that 
keyboard  because  of  its  increased  popularity.  Also,  from  the  user’s  perspective,  getting 
accustomed to QWERTY keyboards made typing easier and quicker, so that the more skilled one 
became in QWERTY, the more utility they derived from it and the harder (costlier) it became for 
them to switch to another keyboard design. If the QWERTY design was the result of random 
selection among alternative keyboards made repeatedly over time and by an increasing number 
of users, despite not being the best design standard, then the history of keyboard standards can be 
considered path-dependent.
Different mechanisms have been proposed to explain the effects of path dependence on 
technology  adoption:  increasing  returns,  positive  feedbacks,  self-reinforcement,  and  lock-in 
(David 1985). Increasing returns imply that the more a choice is made or an action is taken, the 
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greater  its  benefits.  For  example,  a  technology’s  value  increases  as  the  number  of  adopters 
increases. With positive feedbacks, an action or choice creates positive externalities when that 
same choice is made by others. (In theory, positive feedbacks are similar to increasing returns, 
but  they  differ  mathematically).  Lock-in  implies  that  one  choice  becomes  better  or  more 
attractive because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice.
More specifically, the creation of a path starts with an initial triggering event: an event, 
decision or action. A decision or a choice that is made by individuals, organizations, or markets 
may amount to a small event that unintentionally sets off a self-reinforcing process of actions, 
choices or decisions that eventually lead to lock-in. If a process is path dependent, then lock-in 
will  occur on one of the possible outcomes.  Lock-in can happen on any path or choice,  not 
necessarily  on  the  optimal  one,  and  is  the  result  of  self-reinforcing  mechanisms,  a  set  of 
mechanisms that increase the attractiveness of a choice relative to others (Vergne and Durand 
2011). David (1985) proposed that path dependence involves self-reinforcing dynamics that are 
beyond the control of the individual actor and that eventually lead to an irreversible state of 
inflexibility  or  lock-in.  David  (1985)  also  notes  that  the  logic  behind  technological  path 
dependence is grounded in the fact that repeated decisions or choices (e.g., RD investments in a 
technology)  create  sunk  costs,  which  result  in  irreversibilities  along  the  path  of  technology 
development.
Early studies of path dependence (Arthur  1989, 1994) developed models of a  formal 
economic  theory  of  path  dependence  and  proposed  that  increasing  returns  were  the  major 
mechanism  behind  its  effects.  According  to  Arthur’s  view,  the  process  of  becoming  path 
dependent can be characterized by four general properties:
1. Non predictability: there is an indeterminacy of outcome.
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2. Nonergodicity: several outcomes are possible (in economics that implies the existence 
of multiple equilibria), and history selects among the possible outcomes.
3.  Inflexibility:  the  actors  are  locked-in  or  entrapped  to  an  alternative,  so  a  shift  to 
another alternative is impossible.
4. Inefficiency: actions resulting from the path lock the market into an inferior outcome 
(e.g., an inferior technology, standard, or design).
In  the  organizational  literature,  path  dependence  has  been  used  to  explain  the 
development of dynamic capabilities through repeated investment in the organization’s resources 
(Helfat  1994).  Helfat  hypothesized  that  R&D  investments  are  path  dependent,  and  that 
capabilities  emerge  from  a  series  of  path-dependent  learning  experiences.  However,  path 
dependence was not directly operationalized, instead correlations in R&D investment in the past 
and present (the time of study) were used to demonstrate the presence of path dependence.
Sterman and Witemberg (1999) simulated  the path-dependent  emergence of scientific 
paradigms and found that it  is driven by situational characteristics of the environment.  They 
developed an agent-based model in which theories compete for resources and multiple positive 
feedback processes cause the self-reinforcing rise of a new theory. The study showed that the 
likelihood of any new theory (paradigm) to become dominant depends on the environment into 
which it is launched, which in turn depends on the history of the theories or paradigms preceding 
it.  The authors explain this  as the presence of path dependence for emerging theories.  What 
determines the survival of new theories is the presence of positive feedback loops in the external 
environment in which they operate, not the inherent characteristics of the theories.
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Karim and Mitchell (2000) proposed a path dependence explanation for whether firms 
participating in acquisitions change more than firms that do not undertake acquisitions. They 
examined  two kinds  of  organizational  change:  one  resulting  from resource  deepening  and a 
second one resulting from resource extension. Resource deepening is the retention of product 
lines that overlap with current product lines. Resource extension involves retaining product lines 
that  are  distinct  from  a  firm’s  current  product  lines.  They  argue  that  resource  deepening 
represents path-dependent change, while resource extension represents path-breaking change. In 
that study, path dependence was distinguished from path-creation, but path dependence was not 
operationalized  directly,  rather  the  operational  variables  reflected  resource  deepening  and 
extension.
Sydow et al (2009) propose a theoretical framework of organizational path dependence 
and identify characteristics of an organization’s history (events or decisions or anything that is 
considered  a  key  development)  that  would  suggest  the  presence  of  path  dependence.  Those 
characteristics  are:  the  persistence  of  a  decision  alternative,  a  choice  or  an  option  in  an 
organization’s development showing that members or stakeholders or decision-makers have been 
selecting the same option over time despite the presence of alternatives. Those can be technology 
or design alternatives, such as the four clusters in GENI, or more generally decision alternatives 
in  other  organizational  domains  (e.g.,  alternatives  in  financial  decisions,  in  management,  in 
policy aspects, etc.) depending on the study’s focus. 
Moreover, the persistence of a certain choice or option implies that a set of choices or 
options were available or accessible to that organization’s decision-makers, and that the repeated 
selection of the same option could lead to potential inefficiency. Choices or decisions may lead 
to inefficiency when alternatives are ignored, not considered or examined as possible solutions, 
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such as  alternative  technologies,  organizational  policies,  corporate  strategies  or  management 
approaches. Sydow et al. (2009) also emphasize that decision-makers may not be aware that their 
choices can lead to potential inefficiencies at some point in the future, but rather, inefficiency is 
something  that  is  detected  retrospectively  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight  (otherwise  decision-
makers would not have chosen something that they knew would prove inefficient over time). 
Path  dependence,  then,  may  lead  to  decisions,  or  choices  more  generally,  that  are  initially 
optimal  or  efficient,  but  might  become  inefficient  when  made  repeatedly  and  without  the 
consideration of alternatives. 
In addition to the persistence of a  choice and the presence of potential  inefficiencies 
down the road, Sydow et al. (2009) suggest that a third characteristic in an organization’s history 
that might indicate path dependence is a triggering event, or events, that set the decision-making 
process, or path, in motion. An example of a triggering event noted by Sydow et al is a corporate 
strategic  decision,  such as Matsushita’s agreement  with Hollywood studios regarding content 
delivery that gave Matsushita and its VHS design an initial advantage over Sony’s Beta, and 
eventually led to VHS becoming the dominant standard (Cusumano et al. 1992).
Furthermore, another characteristic, or rather, necessary condition for path dependence 
according to Sydow et al.  (2009), is the presence of self-reinforcing dynamics that lead to a 
narrower set of options or decision alternatives over time. Such dynamics can be group dynamics 
among key decision-makers,  or  any organizational  or  social  mechanism that  could  motivate 
individuals or groups to make certain decisions and not others and thus ‘reinforce’ the selection 
of certain alternatives over time. Sydow et al (2009) identify four such social mechanisms that 
are common in organizational  contexts:  the first  one is complementarity,  which makes some 
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alternatives more attractive or efficient because of the presence of complementary options, such 
as complementary technologies (hardware and compatible software). 
A second mechanism is  learning effects,  which refers  to  individuals  or  organizations 
selecting an alternative because they have developed relevant skills over time. A classic example 
of  self-reinforcing  learning effects  is  organizations’  focus on exploitation-oriented  strategies, 
developing strong capabilities or an advantage in that domain over time, but ultimately losing 
sight of exploratory strategies that could direct the organization into new markets (March 1991).
A third mechanism leading to path dependence is what Sydow et al (2009) term ‘adaptive 
expectations’, which refers to instances where an alternative is selected because decision-makers 
expect  that  others  will  also  make  the  same  choice  in  the  future.  An  example  of  adaptive 
expectations is technology users purchasing a certain software or system because they expect it 
to become popular in the near future (this is similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy). In other words, 
decision-makers (or consumers or technology users) ‘adapt’ their expectations and choose not 
the most cost-effective or efficient alternative, but that which they expect to become the norm in 
the future.  
A fourth mechanism leading to path dependence is coordination,  resulting from rules, 
policies or practices that if adopted widely can make interactions among organizations and their 
members more efficient by reducing coordination costs. An example of coordination effects is 
the adoption of certain R&D practices in an organization which ensures efficient collaboration 
among departments and individuals but might make adaptation to new market conditions costly 
or prevent the organization from adjusting their practices and developing new competencies, as 
was the case with Polaroid (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000).
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In summary, path dependence theory explains the high switching costs and lock-in that 
often characterize technology adoption as outcomes of the technology’s history of development. 
Examining a  CI system’s  history of development  then can be informative  for explaining  its 
dominance  over  similar  CI  systems.  CI  systems  will  be more  likely  to  dominate  others  not 
because of their technical superiority or usefulness but because they have attracted users that are 
locked-in to that system and would prefer using it rather than switching to a competitor system.
Proposition  1:  The dominance of  a  cluster  (cyber-infrastructure technology)  is  path-
dependent.
Hypothesis 1: The adoption rate of a cluster (cyber-infrastructure technology) in a given  
spiral (period of development) depends on its adoption rate on the previous spiral.
4.2.2 Project Performance
The management  of IS development  projects  is  challenging;  a  recent  Standish Group 
report  indicates  that  only 32% of software development  projects  are completed  on time and 
within budget, and meet their requirements (The Standish Group International 2009).The failure 
rate of IS projects  is worse in the public sector (e.g.,  Collins and Bicknell  1997). Given the 
failure likelihood of development projects, project management techniques are often adopted as 
an attempt to safeguard against failure in new IS development projects (Slaughter et al. 2006; 
Harter  and  Slaughter  2003).  Project  management  techniques  increase  a  team’s  or  an 
organization’s  project  management  maturity,  and  that,  in  turn,  results  in  enhanced  project 
performance (Kwak and Ibbs 2000). 
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Most  project  management  approaches  or  techniques  involve  following  a  schedule  of 
milestones  (e.g.,  Jelinek  and  Schoonhoven  1990;  Wheelwright  and  Clark  1992).  Project 
performance is then monitored and tracked by examining a team’s ability to meet milestones on 
time. Milestones are deadlines for project tasks or sets of tasks and are useful in that they help 
translate  a project’s  high-level strategy into analyzable technical,  budgetary,  and time-related 
objectives (Jelinek and Schoonhoven 1990). Milestones help managers track the development 
team’s  progress  and  adjust  project  resources  as  needed  (Wheelwright  and  Clark  1992). 
Milestones also serve as guides for developers; they keep development teams aware of the scarce 
resources available to them, and they offer a sense of structure while the team is experimenting 
with alternative designs (Wheelwright and Clark 1992).
Superior  project  performance,  such  as  meeting  milestones  on  times,  is  particularly 
important  when  developers  are  competing  with  other  teams  that  are  developing  similar 
technologies. Superior project performance in terms of met milestones could enhance a system’s 
competitiveness  and/or  dominance  of  similar  systems  by  allowing  developers  and  project 
managers  to  better  allocate  resources  and  to  adjust  the  system’s  design  to  make  it  more 
competitive  while  the  system  is  still  under  development.  Project  managers  can  also  use 
information  from milestones  to  make adjustments  to  the development  schedule  itself  and to 
release a system in the marketplace sooner or with different features. That, in turn, can speed the 
development and ensure that the system reaches the market or becomes available to users at the 
same time as competing systems. When a development team is missing milestones, managers are 
less able to make adjustments to the teams’ resources or to the development schedule, and as a 
result the technology might take longer to develop and reach the market. Project performance 
information then is a valuable indicator of whether a given system is likely to reach the market as 
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scheduled,  and  as  such,  whether  it  can  successfully  compete  with  similar  systems  that  are 
released around the same time. 
As mentioned earlier,  a  way in which enhanced project  performance can influence  a 
system’s competitiveness and dominance of similar systems is by reducing the time-to-market. 
Studies of IS development efforts have shown that for certain kinds of technologies, such as 
collaboration systems, there is a window of opportunity in which a newly released system gains 
popularity and stands to become highly competitive relative to incumbent systems (Stalk 1988, 
Stalk and Hout 1990).  Technologies  that  exhibit  such characteristics  are packaged software, 
collaboration  systems,  computer  hardware,  and  consumer  electronics  (Krubasik  1988).  The 
sooner  a  certain  technology  becomes  available  for  adoption  or  prototyping,  the  greater  the 
likelihood  that  its  adoption  will  surpass  the  adoption  of  similar  technologies  that  might  be 
released later  on,  and the greater  the likelihood that that  technology will  come to dominate 
others  (Utterback  1994).  Missing  that  window  of  opportunity,  that  is,  releasing  a  new 
technology late in the market, may result in reduced user interest and eventually might mean 
that that technology has lost the opportunity to dominate others in the marketplace despite its 
value and usefulness.  In other  words,  being early-to-market  reduces the power of substitute 
technologies. Early adopters will have fewer substitute technologies to choose from, and the first 
technology that becomes available for sale or experimental use (e.g. beta versions) will likely 
gain a critical mass of users before alternative technologies enter the market.
A second way in which project  performance may increase dominance is  by reducing 
control  and coordination  costs  (Kirsch 1996, 1997;  Kraut  and Streeter  1995).  Control  in  IS 
development  projects  refers  to management’s  attempts  to influence  developers  to behave in 
accordance  with  team-  or  organizational  goals  (Kirsch 1996,  1997).  Controlling  IS projects 
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involves  setting  deadlines  and milestones  (outcome control)  and also modeling  expected  or 
desired  behaviors,  such  as  expertise  and  knowledge  sharing  among  developers  (behavior 
control).  The  use  of  milestones  represents  a  formal,  outcome  control  mechanism  and  as 
mentioned earlier it stands to benefit both managers and developers by providing feedback about 
the  development  team’s  available  resources  and  capabilities.  Development  teams  that  meet 
project milestones are then better able to adjust and/or request resources as needed, and to utilize 
their expertise and capabilities in an efficient as well as effective manner (e.g., Boehm 1986). 
Development teams that miss milestones on the other hand, are less likely to use the resources at 
their disposal in an efficient manner either because of lack of planning or because of the delayed 
development  of  key  features  that  the  missed  milestones  reflect.  In  other  words,  meeting 
milestones on time indicates that that team is exercising at least minimal outcome control and 
coordination  in  their  development  efforts,  which  in  turn  better  positions  them to  finish  the 
development early or on time and thus reach the marketplace earlier than competing systems. 
That, in turn, places them in an advantageous position relative to competitors and increases the 
likelihood that that technology will come to dominate competing systems. 
In summary, control and coordination mechanisms, such as formal milestones allow the 
IS  team to  monitor  their  project  performance,  make  adjustments  in  resources  and  goals  as 
needed, and deliver the technology on time. IS projects  that meet their  milestones are more 
likely  to  be completed  earlier  than  and thus  reach the market  earlier,  which increases  their 
chances of dominance over competing systems.
According to the project management perspective, a technology could achieve dominance 
over  another  (in  terms  of  adoption)  through  superior  project  management.  A  dominant 
technology emerges out of a number of competing alternatives when it gains wide acceptance by 
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developers,  users,  or  consumers  at  the  exclusion  of  it  alternatives.  In  cyber-infrastructure 
development  projects,  such as the four technology clusters that comprise GENI, a dominant 
technology  can  emerge  as  new projects  join  the  GENI clusters  and adopt  the  technologies 
developed by the clusters’ teams. Because each project can only use one of the four alternative 
designs as the basis for its development, the PIs (project investigators) and their teams can only 
select or adopt one of the four GENI technologies. The GENI cluster that has attracted the most 
projects  will  dominate  the  other  three  alternatives.  If  project  management  has  as  positive 
influence on technology adoption and dominance, then we would expect that the cluster with the 
most projects will also have superior project performance.
Proposition 2: A dominant cyber-infrastructure technology is the outcome of superior  
project management of the technology’s development project.
Hypothesis 2: The adoption rate of a cluster (cyber-infrastructure technology) in a given  
spiral is positively associated with the performance of that cluster’s projects in the previous  
spiral.
4.2.3 Social Influence
A stream of research within the larger literature on technology adoption suggests that the 
process by which a design becomes dominant is a social influence process among developers, 
users  and organizations  that  have  a  stake  in  the  technology  (Tushman and  Murmann  1998; 
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Utterback 1996; Miller et al 1995). Social influence tactics and organizational politics can shape 
user  preferences  for  some  design  alternatives  and  not  others.  The  ability  to  shape  user 
preferences gives one power to affect adoption decisions, by individuals, teams or organizations, 
which collectively can make a given design into a popular or a niche system. Dominant designs 
can thus emerge through a combination of social influence actions by developers, current users, 
and organizations that have a stake in a given design (Dagwell and Weber 1983;  Miller et al 
1995; Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). 
At the interpersonal level, social influence has been defined as intentional change, either 
psychological or behavioral, that results from the behavior of other people (Turner 1991). In the 
IS  literature,  social  influence  among  peers,  coworkers  and  other  reference  groups  has  been 
shown to affect technology adoption decisions (Venkatesh et al 2003). Assuming that dominant 
designs  reflect  adoption  decisions,  whether  individual  or  collective,  we would  expect  that  a 
technology  is likely to achieve dominance over another when its stakeholders (developers and 
current users) engage in social influence actions that attempt to promote that technology (Robey 
et al. 1989; Markus 1983; Venkatesh et al. 2003). Such social influence actions may involve 
presentations of the technology to various audiences of potential  adopters, descriptions of its 
technical  features  and  functionality,  demonstrations  of  its  possible  uses  and  benefits,  and 
discussions  of  its  usability  (e.g.,  highlighting  its  user-friendly  aspects  besides  its  technical 
specifications). Moreover, developers and current users of a system might attempt to influence 
prospective adopters by presenting the technology in various occasions and via different media, 
such as offline in live public demos, in conferences, workshops or meetings, as well as online in 
websites, wikis and other spaces that publish information about the technology’s development.
28
However,  the  above  IS  studies,  and  subsequent  research  based  on  the  technology 
adoption model have dealt with systems that are stand-alone, fully developed, and commercially 
available,  rather  than  with systems that  are  interdependent  or  integrated  with other  systems, 
incomplete  or  under  development,  and  not  widely  available  in  the  marketplace  (Iacono and 
Orlikowski 2000). CI systems, as mentioned earlier, consist of disparate component technologies 
that have been integrated to form an infrastructure, and, rather than being commercially available 
in a completed static form, are often adopted while still evolving and in an experimental stage of 
development.  Social  influence  processes  might  unfold  in  a  different  manner  between 
stakeholders  of  a  CI system and its  potential  adopters  than  between stakeholders  of  a  non-
infrastructure system and its potential adopters. That is, developers and domain experts might 
attempt to promote a CI system employing different tactics than users of non-CI systems. CI 
developers and domain experts might rely more on peer relationships and networks of colleagues 
to  promote  a  particular  CI  technology.  They  might  rely  on  their  professional  reputation  or 
academic status to influence newcomers in a field or those doubting the value of CI-enabled 
research, thus reducing legitimacy barriers to adoption. They might also attempt to influence 
users  of  other  systems  by  demonstrating  a  CI’s  interoperability  with  other  systems  and  by 
presenting its integrated features and functionality, thus reducing the switching costs for those 
users. Finally, they might frame a CI as a practically useful resource with short-term benefits by 
demonstrating its usability (e.g., its mobile add-ons, communication tools, data storage capacity, 
privacy protocols, etc.), thus reducing cognitive barriers to adoption.
Furthermore,  social  influence  processes  might  not  even  be  an  individual-level 
phenomenon and instead  involve collective  action,  such as teams of developers  and domain 
experts  collaborating  to  construct  presentations  and  demonstrations  of  the  various  CI 
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technologies. Social influence processes might also involve cooperation among institutions that 
would otherwise be competitors in a domain, an academic discipline or a narrow research field 
but depend on the CI becoming a standard, or widely used by other experts, and have thus the 
motive to cooperate to influence how the CI is perceived by prospective adopters and funding 
agencies.
The literature on power and politics  in IS development  has addressed those issues in 
relation to the adoption of new systems (e.g., Markus 1983). If a new system affects the power 
balance  among  its  users,  such  as  giving  less  discretion  and  authority  over  scheduling  and 
decision-making  to  managers  or  administrators  and  more  so  to  their  subordinates,  then, 
according to that literature, managers, administrators and those with higher power will resist or 
reject  the  system  despite  its  superior  functionality  (Robey  et  al.  1989;  Markus  1983).  The 
implication for studies of CI development projects is that alternative designs that redistribute 
decision-making authority or discretionary control over resources among stakeholders will be 
resisted by those who stand to lose any of those privileges once the CI is introduced into their 
work. Those stakeholders will also be less motivated to participate in design decisions in ways 
that move the development efforts forward; rather, they will likely attempt to obstruct or change 
the course of the development effort and the decision-making process to prevent losing power 
and status  that  they previously  had.  Power and status  need not  be only  about  IT resources. 
Because  the  introduction  of  CI  is  implicated  in  the  way in  which  research  outputs  and the 
research process itself are evaluated, power and status concerns will be career-related such as 
academic promotions and the maintenance of a distinctive research identity for domain scientists. 
For IT specialists, power and status concerns can similarly involve career and research-related 
concerns rather than just concerns about the system’s resources.
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Taken together, these observations suggest that the examination of how CI designs are 
selected  should  take  into  account  the  behavior  of  multiple  stakeholder  groups  and  their 
interactions. More specifically, social influence theory would predict that certain kinds of social 
dynamics,  such as communication between developers,  managers and users,  and competition 
among organizations and individual stakeholders, are critical to the process by which CI designs 
emerge.
4.2.4 Technology Frames
Technology Frames
Research in the field of social construction of technology has examined how shared information 
or knowledge, such as knowledge shared among groups of scientists, users, and manufacturers 
influences their understanding of a technology's functions and possible uses (Bijker et al. 1987). 
Multiple  studies  have  shown  that  the  developers’  assumptions  and  knowledge  influence 
decisions made about the system’s design and deployment (Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Markus 
and Bjørn-Anderson 1987). 
More specifically, Boland (1978) defined frames as a set of assumptions, understandings, 
and expectations that individuals have about a new information system (Boland 1978).  A frame 
emerges through the interactions among people, technology and context; therefore, it’s possible 
that different groups or individuals within the same context (e.g. an organization) have different 
frames about a system. Frames are used as a sense-making and problem-solving devices, and 
once constructed are hard to change.
Orlikowski  and Gash (1994) examined  how technological  frames  affect  stakeholders' 
interpretations  and actions  related  to  IS development.  They define  frames  as  the knowledge 
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structures that individuals or groups use to make sense of a new technology, to solve problems 
related  to  the  development  or  use  of  a  new system,  and more  generally,  "the  assumptions, 
expectations, and knowledge they use to understand technology in organizations. This includes 
not only the nature and role of the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and 
consequences of that technology in particular contexts" (p. 178).  Orlikowski and Gash (1994) 
identified three kinds of frames that developers and users of a new technology (Lotus Notes) 
relied on to make sense of that technology:  the nature of the technology (e.g., features), the 
organization’s  technology  strategy,  and  technology-in-use  (the  uses  and  usability  of  the 
technology).  In  addition,  Davidson  (2002)  developed  a  process  model  of  how  frames  and 
changes  in  frames  over  time  affect  developers’  sense-making  during  the  requirements 
determination stage of ISD. Repeated changes in framing the requirements for a new system 
actually disrupted the participants’ understanding of the technology and impeded their sense-
making process. 
In summary, research in both the IS development stream and in the stream of technology 
adoption has developed the concept of frames as an analytic tool for examining the expectations, 
meanings and visions that individuals and groups hold about a new technology. Studies in the 
dominant design literature have not specifically addressed the issue of frames and frame changes 
as an operative variable influencing adoption decisions. However, based on the larger body of 
research on frames and IS development we can hypothesize that social influence, and specifically 
the  frames  that  the  developers  construct  about  their  systems,  will  predict  their  system’s 
dominance.
As mentioned earlier, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) have identified three types of frames 
that  developers  and users of new technologies  rely on to  make sense of those technologies: 
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technical frames that involve features of the technology, use frames that are about the use of new 
technologies,  and  their  organization’s  technology  strategy  which  is  about  the  corporate  IT 
strategy of their employing organizations. Based on the Orlikowski and Gash (1994) findings, 
and since there haven’t been any newer studies to identify more or different types of frames, the 
hypothesis of the current study will concern the same types of frames: technical and use frames. 
Corporate strategy frames cannot be used in the current study since the GENI developers (and 
users/experimenters using the GENI technologies) are not employed by organizations that might 
have corporate IT strategies, rather, they are affiliated with research labs in various university 
departments, so their descriptions and presentations of their technologies would be unlikely to 
involve corporate strategy concerns. The technical and use frames, however, are relevant to all 
GENI developers since the features and the possible uses of the technologies they are working on 
are a primary concern for prospective users, for their project’s funding agencies, and can affect a 
technology’s  adoption,  competitiveness  and  therefore  its  dominance  over  other  similar 
technologies.
Proposition 3:   A dominant cluster (cyber-infrastructure  technology) emerges through 
processes of social influence among its stakeholders.
Hypothesis  3:  The  number  of  (technical  and  usefulness)  frames  that  developers 
(stakeholders) use in presenting their technologies during a Spiral will be positively associated 
with their cluster’s adoption rates in the following Spiral.
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5.0 SITE DESCRIPTION
The site of the present study is the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) 
initiative funded by the National Science Foundation. GENI was designed for the purpose of 
enabling large-scale networking experimentation. Its goal is to create a cyber-infrastructure that 
would  enable  running  experiments  and  tests  to  create  innovations  in  networking.  GENI’s 
development  began  in  2007,  and  oversight  of  the  overall  project  was  granted  to  BBN 
Technologies  who  formed  the  GENI  Project  Management  Office  (GPO).  Initially,  GENI 
included five technology development clusters, however, one cluster was not as successful and 
was merged with one of the other four clusters early on in the development process. GENI is 
now  comprised  of  four  major  technology  clusters,  which  represent  different  networking 
technologies. 
Each  cluster  is  responsible  for  designing  and  developing  systems  based  on different 
networking  technologies  (table  2).  Each  cluster  includes  multiple  technology  development 
projects and project teams, and can potentially support multiple research experiments and users 
from  non-profit  (academic)  and  for  profit  research  institutions.  Development  teams  receive 
funding by submitting proposals which are evaluated by the GPO. Research experimenters can 
adopt or use a cluster’s technology and run experiments funded by NSF research grants.
GENI was selected for this research because it is a program of technology development 
projects; because all four clusters are supported by the same “umbrella organization” (GENI), 
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having a  single  project  management  office  (the GPO) and the  same funding agency (NSF), 
external  variability  is  minimized  in  the  comparison  of  the  four  clusters.  At  the  same time, 
internal-to-GENI variability is maximized as the four clusters differ in the type of technologies 
under development, their history of development prior to GENI, the number of sub-projects they 
support and the number and kind of experiments and experimenters that are associated with each 
framework. All those internal factors vary along dimensions that allow us to compare the fit of 
each theory to a given framework’s characteristics and trajectory of development.  Moreover, 
GENI was conceived as a collection of competing designs, so the four clusters are competing to 
become the final design for GENI; that makes them an appropriate research site for examining 
the processes by which cyber-infrastructure systems become dominant. 
Figure 1. GENI and its initial 5 Clusters
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Table 2. Description of GENI Clusters
Cluster 
Name
PlanetLab ProtoGeni ORCA ORBIT GENI-
Wide
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n Development of 
control 
framework 
reference 
implementations 
and integrating a 
range of 
component 
technologies and 
tools.
Network 
control and 
measurement, 
and integrated 
experiment 
environments.
Developme
nt of 
resource 
allocation 
strategies 
and 
integration 
of sensor 
networks.
Wireless 
networks 
developme
nt projects.
Projects 
that cut 
across 
clusters; 
e.g., 
Security, 
Operations.
5.1.1 GENI’s Method of Development
All technology clusters in GENI follow the spiral development method. Spiral development is a 
systems development method used in information technology development projects. According 
to this method, a system goes through four stages of development before it can be considered 
completed: first, the user needs and requirements for the system are defined. Second, alternative 
designs are considered and a tentative design of the system is constructed. Third, a prototype is  
constructed out  of the alternative  designs.  Prototypes  are scaled-down approximations  of the 
final system. Fourth, the first prototype is evaluated in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, and 
user requirements are again defined based on that prototype; then a second prototype is created 
and evaluated as to how well it meets the users’ requirements. This process is repeated in cycles 
(spirals) until a system emerges that best matches the users’ requirements. The spiral model is 
generally used in  large, expensive and complicated IT development projects that involve shifting 
or hard to define user requirements (Boehm, 1986).
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5.1.2 GENI Stakeholders
Each cluster in GENI has multiple IT projects associated with it. Stakeholders of a GENI cluster 
include:  developers  in  the  cluster’s   IT  projects,  the  experimenters  using  the  technologies 
developed  in  the  projects,  the  sponsoring  agency  (NSF)  and  the  project  management  office 
(GPO) that oversees the cluster, and prospective users and experimenters of the technologies 
developed in the projects. If a project initiates collaboration with another project in GENI, then 
those projects will have common stakeholders, the expanded group of developers, experimenters, 
sponsors, GPO and new collaborators and users. If a project or cluster initiates collaboration with 
a development team or another CI development project outside GENI, then, similarly, the group 
of stakeholders expands to include the new developers, users, experimenters and oversight and 
sponsoring committees of the two projects. 
Stakeholder groups differ in terms of the interests they hold with respect to the technology. 
Developers are computer scientists who tend to value experimentation over system performance 
and reliability, which is something that users and experimenters value greatly. The developers’ 
interests  might  differ  from those of users and the project  managers:  computer  scientists  and 
experimenters (the domain scientists) in academia are interested in GENI’s technologies as an 
opportunity to do research that will lead to tenure and/or other promotion in their respective 
fields. However, to achieve that goal, computer scientists are required to build new, experimental 
technologies  that  haven’t  been  tried  elsewhere,  whereas  domain  scientists  and  other 
experimenters need to have a reliable, high-performing cyber-infrastructure on which to run new 
studies. 
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Those interests and values are often in conflict even when the two stakeholder groups have 
the same goal, using the CI system for research and ultimately gaining  tenure and promotion 
through their research. Similarly, the values and interests of the project management office might 
conflict with those of the developers, as the former aims to keep the CI development project 
within schedule and budgetary constraints  and the latter  (the developers) strive for technical 
excellence but not necessarily superior project performance.  
The  interests  of  the  sponsoring  agency  and  those  of  users  might  also  differ  since  the 
sponsoring agency funds CI projects that are supposed to last for an extended number of years 
and is interested in having users adopt those technologies and continue to use them over the 
course of their career, with the goal of making CI-enabled research in academia the norm or a 
standard. Users, on the other hand, while they may share the goal of using CI technologies for 
research purposes, they still might interpret the CI differently, as an opportunity to use cutting-
edge technologies for only part of their research but not over an extended period of time, or 
might not be interested in using CI systems at all if that implies sharing their research data and 
making it widely available to other users through repositories and databases that are designed to 
last multiple years. The large-scale and long-term orientation of CI systems then, accounts for 
the diversity of interests and values that might exist among the system’s stakeholders, and as the 
GENI’s  clusters  develop  different  kinds  of  technologies,  their  stakeholder  groups  and  their 
interests  need  to  be  taken  into  account  when  examining  the  development  process  and 
competition among the cluster’s technologies.
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6.0 METHODS
6.1 THIS STUDY’S APPROACH
This study follows the approach of infrastructural inversion (Bowker 1994) mentioned 
earlier,  by focusing on design- and development-related events and activities that  took place 
during the development of GENI. The main advantage of examining design-related events is that 
it enables us to look at how individuals and teams of developers think about design alternatives, 
to trace how one alternative becomes more popular or desirable than others, and to imagine how 
a CI system might have been designed or developed differently had the actions and decisions of 
its developers been different. In a sense, this approach looks at the CI’s development from the 
inside out, “inverting” the process of development and exposing the antecedent events, actions 
and considerations that led to the CI system’s eventual form, structure and organization. Some 
examples  of  development-related  activities  are:  the  collaboration  among  GENI’s  design  and 
prototyping  community  in  order  to  agree  on  key  system  specifications  and  interfaces;  the 
meetings,  workshops  and  other  communication  within  members  of  each  GENI  cluster  that 
address  issues  of  development,  project  management,  and  promotion  of  the  technologies 
developed by each cluster; the organization of GENI conferences and the presentations and other 
promotion efforts made by each cluster to generate interest in their technologies and attract more 
participants, experimenters and potential collaborators; and the project reviews and evaluations 
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of the development efforts of each cluster team by the project managers and the impact of those 
evaluations on the development trajectory of each cluster.
A qualitative study design was chosen to examine the technology development process 
over time for the four clusters that comprise GENI. Alternative methodologies,  such as field 
experiments,  simulation,  and survey methodology  are  unsuitable  because  of  the  longitudinal 
nature  of  the  study  (Yin  1994;  Galliers,  1992).  A  case  study  design  attempts  to  describe 
relationships  which  exist  in  reality  in  a  single  or  multiple  organizations  and allows  for  the 
examination of ill-defined variables which are common in real-world contexts. The goal of this 
research design is to use social behavior occurring in real-world context in order to understand a 
little known phenomenon such as the competition of multiple technology designs while they are 
still in early stages of development (Cavaye 1996).
6.2 CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT
6.2.1 Dominance of a technology (cluster)
Dominance  of  a  technology  is  the  adoption,  use  or  deployment  of  that  technology 
(Abernathy  and  Utterback  1978).  In  the  literature  of  technology  diffusion  a  technology 
“emerges” as dominant out of a number of competing alternatives when it gains wide acceptance 
by developers, users, or consumers (Utterback 1996). In the present study, a technology becomes 
more/less dominant when it gets adopted or implemented by more/fewer sites and experimental 
projects.  Dominance reflects  an increase in the technology’s competitiveness over alternative 
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technologies.  A  technology  can  increase  its  dominance  through  its  technical  development, 
superior  performance  of  its  development  project,  or  through  its  stakeholders’  attempts  to 
influence the terms of competition in favor of their cluster. A GENI cluster can be considered 
“dominant” over another if it has a greater number of projects or sites that have deployed its 
technologies.  To  determine  whether  a  cluster  has  gained  dominance  over  another,  I  used  a 
measure of dominance-as-adoption,  assessed at the cluster level (assessed at the end of each 
spiral from 2007 to 2011). Dominance as adoption has two indicators:
 - Number of new projects in a cluster 
- Number of new sites implementing components of a cluster or joining a cluster
To construct a measure of dominance for each cluster, I calculated the relative percentage 
of sites and projects (separately) that each cluster has gained at the end of each Spiral, relative to 
the ones it had at the beginning of that Spiral. That is the number of new sites and projects that 
have deployed the technologies  of a cluster  in  a Spiral,  divided by the number of sites and 
projects that the same cluster had at previous Spiral. This is a relative growth measure, indicating 
how much a cluster has ‘grown’ in dominance over the course of each Spiral  relative to its  
dominance in the previous Spiral. Because it is a relative measure, Spiral 1 does not have any 
scores for this measure since it is the first phase of development for each cluster.
 I  also  used  a  second  calculation  to  construct  a  second  measure  of  dominance:  the 
absolute percentage of sites and projects (separately calculated) that each cluster has in each 
Spiral; that is, the number of sites and projects that have adopted the technologies of a cluster in 
each Spiral,  divided by the total  number of sites and projects  that  exist/were funded in that 
Spiral. This is a measure of dominance that is relative not to a cluster’s earlier dominance level  
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but to the dominance of the rest three clusters in that same Spiral.  These two indicators, the 
relative growth score and the absolute dominance score are two different measures of the same 
construct; they describe a different aspect of each cluster’s dominance (dominance relative to the 
cluster’s earlier dominance, and dominance relative to the other three clusters’ dominance in the 
same Spiral). 
6.2.2 Path Dependence
Sydow et al (2009) define path dependence as “a rigidified, potentially inefficient action pattern 
built up by the unintended consequences of former decisions and positive feedback processes”. 
Path dependence was assessed by examining each technology’s   history such as its  stage of 
development when GENI was funded and at the start of spiral one, the  early experiments and 
projects using that technology prior to GENI’s funding, and the linkages among events, actions 
or decisions that led to experimenters, developers or project managers to select or prioritize one 
technology over the others over time.
6.2.3 Project Performance
The  project  performance  factors  that  are  most  relevant  to  cyber-infrastructure 
development projects are the technology development  schedule and deadlines, such as meeting 
milestones on time. Because the cyber-infrastructure technologies that are the focus of this study 
(ProtoGeni, PlanetLab, ORCA, ORBIT) are not complete systems at the time of the study, this 
study will  focus only on the progress  performance aspect  which is  reflected  in  the cluster’s 
developer teams’ met or unmet milestones. The development schedules and milestones are set by 
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the project office in all clusters, so there is a common management structure and a common set  
of  formal  coordination  mechanisms  (quarterly  project  reports,  and  quarterly  working  group 
meetings  that  discuss  the  milestones  in  the  GENI  engineering  conferences).  All  four 
development  teams  have  been  using  the  method  of  tracking  their  progress  through  project 
milestones, which they assess as being late, early, or on time. 
Project  performance  reflects  how  advanced  a  cluster  or  project  in  GENI  is  in  its 
development  of  various  cyber-infrastructure  technologies,  and  is  indicated  by  project 
management  metrics  such  as  milestones  and  development  problems  and  the  speed  and 
effectiveness with which the development team addresses them.  First, a project performance 
score was constructed at the project-level by adding the number of on-time and early milestones 
its developers had reached, and then subtracting the number of its late milestones. A score for 
project performance was then constructed for each GENI cluster by aggregating (adding) the 
project performance scores of each cluster’s projects.
6.2.4 Social Influence and Framing
To  determine  whether  developers  and  stakeholders  engage  in  competitive  moves  to 
promote  the  technology  I  examined  data  from  presentations  at  the  GENI  Engineering 
Conferences (GECs), the email communication in the development’s archives, and the clusters’ 
websites.  Social influence at the interpersonal level has been traditionally defined as intentional 
change, either psychological or behavioral, that results from the behavior of other people (Turner 
1991).  Social  influence  was  assessed  through the  frames  that  the  GENI developers  used  in 
presentations  and descriptions of their  technologies.  As mentioned earlier,  frames have been 
defined as "the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge they use to understand technology in 
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organizations”  (Orlikowski  and  Gash  1994). Frames  are  expressed  through  discourse;  that 
includes verbal descriptions, written materials such as reports and presentations, visual images, 
and  stories  that  individuals  or  groups  construct  or  employ  to  describe  or  make  sense  of  a 
technology (Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Moch and Fields 1985). This discourse may involve 
multiple  media and may take place in various contexts  (e.g.,  group meetings,  organizational 
reports).  Data on frames,  then,  should be collected  from multiple  sources and materials  that 
include descriptions or presentations of the technology of interest.
For each cluster, two kinds of frames were identified, technical and usefulness frames 
based on Orlikowski and Gash (1994). The sums of a cluster’s technical and usefulness frames 
were calculated separately for each Spiral, and then the total sum of both kinds of frames was 
calculated.  Greater  number  of  frames  indicated  higher  levels  of  social  influence  of  a  given 
cluster.
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Table 3. Construct Definitions and Measures
Construct/Theory Definition Measurement Data Source
Organizational 
Path Dependence 
A “potentially 
inefficient action 
pattern built up by 
the unintended 
consequences of
former decisions and 
positive feedback 
processes” (Sydow 
et al, 2009).
Identification of a 
sequence or pattern of 
decisions or actions that 
are reinforced by certain 
social mechanisms.
Interviews with 
GENI participants, 
developers’ mailing 
list archive.
Path  Dependence: 
Self-Reinforcing 
Mechanisms
Social  mechanisms/ 
processes  that  drive 
path dependence.
Identification of a 
number of self-
reinforcing mechanisms 
(coordination, 
complementarity, 
learning, adaptive 
expectations).
Interviews  with  GENI 
participants,  developers’ 
mailing list archive.
Path-Dependence: 
Inefficiencies
Potential or actual 
inefficiency of an 
individual or 
organizational 
decision or action 
resulting from path-
dependence.
Identification of 
decisions or actions that 
could be potentially 
inefficient (or have been 
actually inefficient).
Interviews with GENI 
participants, developers’ 
mailing list archive.
Project 
Performance 
Average Number of 
milestones reached 
in that cluster.
Project reports and 
project retrospectives 
documents in clusters’ 
wiki pages.
Social Influence Social influence 
attempts on the part 
of a cluster’s 
stakeholders to 
influence the 
development 
process.
Frequency of frames 
used to present a 
cluster’s technologies: 
how many times each 
frame (technical or use) 
appears in a cluster’s 
presentations, demos, 
reports.
Cluster and project 
presentations in the 
GENI wiki , project 
websites, developer 
listserv, observation data 
on GEC conference 
demos.
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Social Influence –
Frames
A frame is the way a 
cluster’s technology 
is presented and/or 
described by its 
stakeholders.
Identify references made 
to the cluster’s 
technology in reports, 
presentations and 
demos. Code the 
technology’s description 
with what kind of frame 
is used. A frame can be 
‘derived’ by 
summarizing an object’s 
(e.g., the technology’s) 
description until a single 
tag/label emerges that 
describes the content in 
a few (one-two) words. 
Aggregate measure at 
cluster level by adding 
the number of technical 
and use frames in a 
cluster’s projects.
Cluster and project 
presentations in the 
GENI wiki, project 
websites, developer 
listserv archive, 
observation data on 
GEC conference demos.
6.3 DATA COLLECTION
The research design is a case study design (Yin 1994) in which a GENI cluster is the unit of  
analysis. Data was collected from archives of communication among GENI stakeholders, such as 
email listservs, meeting notes, progress reports, and other project documents from each GENI 
cluster.  In addition,  interview data with twenty GENI members were used to supplement the 
archival  data.  Interviewees  were  GENI  developers,  project  managers  and  members  of  the 
funding agency that supports GENI. The archival data was also supplemented by non-participant 
observation  from GENI  demos  and  presentations  that  take  place  at  the  GENI  Engineering 
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Conferences  (GECs).  That  allows  for  triangulation  of  the  data,  as  suggested  by  Eisenhardt 
(1989). 
The focus of the study is the first three spirals of development, which began in 2007. The 
data collection followed the start and end dates of each spiral (2007-2011). The start and end 
dates of spirals are usually indicated in the meeting notes, progress reports, and are also reflected 
in the milestone reports. For example, the beginning of the second spiral is indicated by the start  
of  integration  development  (integrating  the main  technology of  a  cluster  with  other  projects 
across clusters). From that it can be inferred that the end date of the first spiral for that cluster is 
the last instance of recorded communication (or announcement in GEC archives) prior to the 
beginning of the integration development efforts.
The archival data is available online through the GENI wiki (www.geni.net/wiki) and the 
developer listservs allow anybody with online access to register and access the archives of past 
communication. The main source of data is the GENI wiki. Each cluster has its own wiki, which 
includes documents such as project reports, project data (milestones, deadlines), technical notes 
such as reported errors in the system and whether they have been addressed, meeting minutes of 
the cluster’s working groups, access to the developers’ listservs, slide presentations from the 
GENI conferences (GECs). A second source of data is the project websites; not all projects in a 
cluster have websites, but those that do include information about the technology’s history of 
development that often predates GENI, and other information related to the project’s history. 
The path dependence hypothesis was tested based on interview data and data from the 
GENI developers’ mailing list. Interviews were conducted during Spiral Three (2010-2011) and 
respondents were twenty in total and included GENI developers, project managers and members 
of GENI’s funding agency. The developers’ mailing list data is archived in the GENI wiki.
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Data about project milestones were collected from the same online archive, the GENI 
wiki (www.geni.net/wiki). IS development projects in all clusters make available their quarterly 
project reports, project review documents, and track their milestones on their webpages in the 
GENI wiki.  All  those three data sources were used to gather information about each project 
team’s met or unmet milestones in spirals one and two. Each milestone was classified as being 
early,  late  or on time.  Data about project milestones were aggregated at  the cluster level  by 
summing all milestones in a cluster’s projects. Those scores were then converted to percentages 
to make them comparable across clusters as the four clusters did not have the same number of 
scheduled milestones throughout the two spirals. That data were then aggregated at the level of 
spiral, so that each cluster has three milestone indicators in each spiral (% of early milestones, % 
of  late  milestones,  %  of  on-time  milestones).  A  single  score  of  project  performance  was 
computed by adding a cluster’s number of on-time milestones to its early milestones and then 
subtracting its late milestones.
Data on frames was collected from materials such as posters and slides presentations that 
the clusters’ developers gave at the GENI conferences, descriptions of the technologies in the 
clusters’ websites and wikis and in the email discussions they had on the developer listserv. The 
majority of the frames data came from the GENI conference presentations (more than 80% of 
distinct frames); the project websites and wikis had a limited number of technology descriptions. 
In total, approximately 280 instances of technology descriptions were identified that could be 
considered as frames. Some of those were duplicated across the GENI conferences, so they were 
counted only once (only the first instance of the presentations or description). Table 4 describes 
each data type and the volume of data that was used in the assessment and measurement of each 
construct and theory.
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Table 4.  Data Overview
Theory Data Type Data Volume
Path Dependence Interviews 20 respondents (Project PIs, 
managers, developers, 
experimenters)
GENI wiki Project wikis within the larger 
GENI wiki
Developer 
listservs
4 listservs - one per cluster, ~100 
emails per year (2 each week on 
average)
Project 
Websites
29 project websites
Social Influence,  Frames,
Project Management
GEC project 
presentations 
and demos 
11 conferences in 2007-2011, ~30 
slide and poster presentations and 
demos in each 
 Meeting Notes 3-4 cluster team meetings per GEC 
conference
Project reports 4 project reports annually per 
project in each cluster (Total ~50 
across all clusters)
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6.4 DATA CODING
The collected  data  was coded following Strauss  and Corbin’s  (1990) open,  selective  coding 
procedure. Only the qualitative part of the data was coded, that is, the data that was used to test 
the  path  dependence  and  the  social  influence  hypotheses  (the  project  performance  and 
dominance data are quantitative). First, the relevant constructs from the literature were coded in 
the  raw  data  and  then  a  range  of  values  were  identified  for  each  construct  which  allows 
comparing the GENI clusters along those constructs. The coding procedure for each construct 
and theory is described in greater detail below.
6.4.1 Path Dependence
Path dependence theory was assessed with data regarding development-related incidents. Data 
sources include: the GENI wiki and each cluster’s wiki pages (in geni.net),  quarterly project 
reports that each cluster and its projects submitted to the project management office (the GPO), 
interview  data  with  some  of  GENI’s  project  managers,  experimenters  and  developers,  the 
developers’  mailing  list,  meeting  notes  from  project  team  meetings  (that  are  uploaded  by 
developers in the projects’ wiki pages), and project websites.
The coding of the data proceeded as follows:
1) Key  incidents  to  the  development  of  the  four  clusters  were  identified  in  archival 
documents that described, reported or discussed the design and development of projects 
in  each cluster.  Incidents  were coded as events,  decisions,  or activities,  based on the 
coding scheme and suggestions in the studies of Langley and Truax (1994), and Langley 
(1990).  More specifically,  Langley (1990) discusses  several  approaches  for  analyzing 
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qualitative data; the coding of events, activities and decisions is proposed as an approach 
that’s appropriate for the purpose of creating a map (or timeline) of key incidents in the 
history of an organization. This “visual mapping” approach helps researchers compare 
the evolution or development of an organization’s history and helps identify, and present, 
linkages among key incidents.
2) A timeline of GENI-wide events, decisions, activities was constructed.
3) The events, decisions, and activities in GENI’s timeline were coded as to whether they 
involved or represented one of the three characteristics that according to Sydow et al 
(2009) indicate path dependence (persistence, potential inefficiency, triggering event(s).
4) The  events,  decisions  and  activities  in  the  GENI  timeline  were  coded  according  to 
whether they referred to any of the self-reinforcing mechanisms (proposed by Sydow et 
al 2009). 
6.4.2 Social Influence and Frames
As mentioned earlier, the data sources for social influence and the technology frames were the 
GENI conference presentations and demos, and the project websites. Frames were identified in 
each  document  (slide  presentation,  demo  poster,  website  description  of  a  project)  by  first 
identifying descriptions of the cluster technologies. Those are chunks of text (a sentence or a few 
sentences, which might include images) in a slide, poster or in an online document. In theory, a 
technology can be ‘framed’ in various ways when it is presented or described, so each document 
(slide presentation, website, poster) may include multiple descriptions of the same technology 
and thus multiple frames. Each description of a technology was coded or labeled with a frame. 
A frame can:
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1. describe  the  technology’s  features  (the  technology’s  development  might  have 
been completed)
2. describe  the  technology’s  purpose and goals  if  its  development  has  not  been 
completed
3. describe the technology’s technical advantages over other systems
4. describe the technology as a proposed solution to a technical problem 
5. describe  the  technology  as  a  tool  that  might  be  useful  to  experimenters  or 
researchers or students
6. describe  the  technology  as  a  proposed  solution  to  an  education  or  research 
problem
7. describe possible uses of the technology
8. describe past impacts that the technology had on certain groups of users
As the above list indicates, two kinds of technology descriptions emerged from the data. While 
the first four kinds of descriptions are purely technical frames, the last four frames are about the 
technology’s use, usability or usefulness (past or future). Moreover, the same technology (or 
cluster) may be described in both technical and use terms, either in the same presentation (e.g., in 
the same poster) or in different documents at different times. Below are some examples of each 
kind of frame: 
- Technical frame (description of the technology’s features): 
52
“This  demo  shows  several  aspects  of  GpENI:   -the  basic  operational  configuration  and 
monitoring capabilities of the GpGENI global infrastructure, -PlanetLab-based slice creation: the 
demo allows users to create an arbitrary overlay loop, shows and overlay topology using the 
google maps GUI and measures the latency of probes sent along the loop, - Interconnectioin with 
MAX demonstrating the transfer of LHC scientific data from the Prairiefire supercomputer at  
UNL to a PlanetLab mode at MAX using ION” (GpENI project, GEC9 conference presentation).
- Technical frame (the technology is described as a solution to a problem): 
“Developers have long lamented the programming interface provided by the network. It is clear 
that  low-level  sockets are not  the ideal  way to communicate and reason about  execution on 
remote machines. Seattle makes developing networked applications easy and makes the power of 
cloud computing accessible to all developers” (Million Node GENI project, GEC9 conference 
presentation)
- Usefulness frame (description of some of the technology’s benefits and uses)
“Seattle [system] is ideal for students, researchers, and companies that want to prototype and test  
code on testbeds that have varying scale, diversity, and topologies. The same code may easily be 
run  on  a  variety  of  operating  systems,  architectures,  and  network  environments  in  order  to 
understand the performance and dynamics of a distributed system” (Million Node GENI project,  
GEC9 conference presentation)
- Usefulness frame (technology is described as a tool useful for researchers)
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“Cron is a cyber-infrastructure of reconfigurable optical networks environment that can provide 
multiple virtual networking testbseds consisting of routers, delay links and high end workstation 
operating  up  to  1gigs  per  sec  bandwidth  1x  faster).  Different  application  developers  and 
networking researchers can use those virtually created high speed networking and computing 
environments WITHOUT technical  knowledge of network hadrwares and softwares” (CRON 
project, GEC9).
6.5 DATA ANALYSIS
Each of the three proposed theories was examined as a potential explanation for variation in the 
clusters’ dominance scores. The unit of analysis is the cluster. For each cluster, a matrix was 
constructed to organize the observations regarding the main constructs and theories. Construct 
validity and reliability were established by relying on multiple data sources for each construct 
and theory (Yin 1989). Construct validity can also be established by demonstrating the “chain of 
events” that are used as evidence for a theory (Yin 1989), such as the timelines showing the 
clusters’ development history. Each cluster ultimately has values of low/med/high in each theory, 
indicating  how  well  that  theory  explains  that  cluster’s  development.  The  theory  that  best 
describes the most clusters and their development will be the best fit for the data.
Since the data collection begins at the project level, with each cluster having multiple 
projects, this makes the study an “embedded” case study (Yin 1989). Data collected at a lower 
level, such as the project level, had to be aggregated at a higher level, that of a cluster, in order 
for the theories to be comparable.  The data analysis for each theory is described in the next 
section.
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7.0 RESULTS
The results for each hypothesis are described in detail below.
7.1 DOMINANCE
Tables  5 and 6 below describe each cluster’s  dominance (or adoption rates),  in  relative and 
absolute scores, assessed in terms of sites and projects that have adopted the technologies of that 
cluster. Spiral One has only absolute indicators of dominance /adoption because there is no prior 
period of development for calculating growth of a cluster’s adoption rate over time. In Spiral 
Three no new GENI projects were funded, so there are no indicators for dominance in terms of 
new projects for that period. Tables 5 and 6 present the dominance/adoption scores for each 
cluster in each Spiral (percent scores are in table 5, and numerical scores are in table 6).
The relative growth measure indicates how much a cluster has ‘grown’ in dominance 
relative to its dominance level in the previous Spiral (or how much its adoption has increased 
over the same period). For example, PlanetLab has grown in dominance 93.3% in terms of new 
sites that deployed its technologies during Spiral 2, and 71.4% in terms of new projects that were 
funded/ started in Spiral 2 that adopted its technologies.
The absolute score indicates what percentage of GENI’s projects or sites have adopted a 
particular  cluster’s  technologies  at  any  given  time.  For  example,  PlanetLab  had  a  28% 
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dominance over the other clusters in Spiral 1, calculated in terms of the number of sites that have 
adopted  PlanetLab’s  technologies  (ie.,  28%  of  all  GENI  sites  in  Spiral  1  have  adopted 
PlanetLab’s  technologies).  Similarly,  30.4% of  all  GENI  projects  in  Spiral  1  have  adopted 
PlanetLab’s technologies.
The cluster  with the greater  adoption  rates  during Spiral  One that  can be considered 
“dominant” for that period is ProtoGeni in terms of projects (35%), and ORBIT in terms of sites 
(31%). These are absolute scores of adoption and as such they indicate each cluster’s share of 
GENI projects or sites that have adopted its technologies (e.g., 35% of GENI projects during 
Spiral One have adopted ProtoGeni’s technologies, while 31% of GENI research sites during 
Spiral One have adopted ORBIT technologies).That way no single cluster emerges as completely 
dominant of both projects and sites during Spiral One.
In Spiral Two ProtoGeni emerges as the dominant cluster in terms of both projects and 
sites with the exception of relative growth in projects: ORCA has the greatest growth of adoption 
rates in projects (140%) while ProtoGeni has 137% growth in projects. Both clusters had a much 
larger number of projects adopting their technologies in Spiral Two relative to the number of 
projects they had in the previous Spiral. Similarly Two ProtoGeni dominates the other clusters in 
terms of absolute scores of adoption by sites and projects;  that is, the largest share of GENI 
projects and sites adopted ProtoGeni’s technologies during  Spiral Two.
No new projects were funded in Spiral Three, so the four clusters can be compared only 
by  the  number  of  research  sites  that  adopted  their  technologies.  PlanetLab  emerges  as  the 
dominant cluster in terms of both relative and absolute indicators of adoption. That is, PlanetLab 
had the greatest growth in number of sites that adopted its technologies in Spiral Three compared 
to the sites that were using its technologies in the previous Spiral. Similarly, PlanetLab had also 
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the largest share of GENI research sites deploying its technologies compared to the number of 
sites that chose different clusters.
Table 5. Adoption Rates of each Cluster
Spiral 1 Spiral 2 Spiral 3
 
Absolute 
score – 
Adoption by 
Sites
Absolute 
score – 
Adoption by 
Projects
Relative 
Growth
in Sites
Relative 
Growth
In Projects
Absolute 
score – 
Adoption by 
Sites
Absolute score 
– Adoption by 
Projects
Relative 
Growth
in Sites
Absolute 
score – 
Adoption by 
Sites
PlanetLab 28% 30.4%
9
3.3% 71.4% 28% 25.5% 193% 42%
ProtoGeni 20.5% 35% 209% 137% 33% 40.5% 27% 21%
ORCA 20.5% 22%
1
18% 140% 23% 25.5% 142% 28.6%
ORBIT 31% 13% 0% 33% 16%  8.5% 0% 8.4%
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Table 6. Adoption of all  Clusters
PlanetLab ProtoGeni ORCA ORBIT Total
Spiral 1 
Projects
7 8 5 3 23
New Projects-
Spiral 2
5 11 7
1
24
Total Proj. 
Spiral 2
12 19 12 4 47
Sites Spiral 1
15 11 11 17 54
New Sites 
Spiral 2
14 23 13 0 50
Total Sites 
Spiral 2
29 34 24 17 105
New Sites 
Spiral 3
56 9
34
0 99
Total Sites
Spiral 3
85 43     58 17 203
Table 7 below lists all clusters in order of dominance, from highest to lowest, for each Spiral. For 
example, in terms of projects, the most dominant cluster in Spiral 1 was ProtoGeni, followed by 
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PlanetLab.  In Spiral 2 the most dominance cluster was ORCA in relative growth terms, and 
ProtoGeni in absolute terms.
Table 7. Cluster Dominance in Projects
Spiral 1 - Projects Spiral 2 - Projects
Relative
Growth
Absolute
Dominance
Relative
Growth
Absolute
Dominance
Highest -- ProtoGeni ORCA ProtoGeni
-- PlanetLab ProtoGeni PlanetLab, 
ORCA (tie)
-- ORCA PlanetLab ORBIT
Lowest -- ORBIT ORBIT --
In terms of research sites that deployed cluster technologies (table 8), most sites in Spiral One 
adopted ORBIT’s technologies,  making that cluster dominant for Spiral  One. In Spiral  Two, 
ProtoGeni emerges as the dominant cluster, both in absolute and relative terms. In Spiral Three, 
PlanetLab emerges as the dominant cluster, followed by ORCA, both in absolute and relative 
terms.
Table 8.  Cluster Dominance in Sites.
Spiral 1 - Sites Spiral 2 - Sites Spiral 3 - Sites
Relative
Growth
Absolute
Dominance
Relative
Growth
Absolute
Dominance
Relative
Growth
Absolute
Dominance
Highest    ORBIT ProtoGeni ProtoGeni PlanetLab PlanetLab
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--
   
--
ProtoGeni, 
ORCA (tie)
ORCA PlanetLab ORCA ORCA
   
--
PlanetLab PlanetLab ORCA ProtoGeni ProtoGeni
Lowest    
--
ORBIT ORBIT ORBIT ORBIT
The graphs below show the  adoption  trajectories  of  each  cluster,  for  projects  and sites  that 
adopted that cluster, both in absolute and relative terms. The graphs were created by plotting the 
dominance results (percent of adoption) of each cluster during the three Spirals. Each cluster’s 
adoption  trajectory  can  be  seen  in  terms  of  projects  and  research  sites  that  deployed  its 
technologies starting in Spiral One up until Spiral Two.
Figure 2. PlanetLab's Adoption Rates
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PlanetLab: The above graph shows PlanetLab’s adoption rates in projects and sites in 
absolute and relative scores. PlanetLab is the cluster that has the highest level of dominance (or 
the greatest amount of growth in sites in both Spiral 2 and Spiral 3. More specifically, in terms of 
relative  growth in  sites  (new sites  deploying PlanetLab  technologies),  PlanetLab  has  a  93% 
growth from Spiral 1 to Spiral 2, and also the same amount of growth (93%) in sites from Spiral 
2 to Spiral 3. That is the highest level of growth among the four GENI clusters in both periods.
In terms of absolute scores of dominance,  PlanetLab starts out with the highest number 
of sites (15 in Spiral 1), which is 28% dominance over the rest of the clusters in terms of new 
sites deploying PlanetLab technologies. In Spiral 2, it remains at that level of dominance, 28%, 
over the other clusters in terms of new sites, and in Spiral 3 it increases to 42% dominance,  
which is still the highest level compared to the other tree clusters.
In terms of experimental projects, PlanetLab starts out with 7 projects in Spiral 1 and 
gains 5 new projects in Spiral 2, which reflects a 71% growth in dominance. In absolute terms, 
that  is  a 30% dominance in Spiral  1, and PlanetLab is second to ProtoGeni which has 35% 
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dominance. In Spiral 2, and in terms of new projects joining the cluster, PlanetLab decreases in 
dominance from 30 % to 25% (that is in absolute terms). In Spiral 3 none of the four GENI 
clusters had any new projects so there is no data in that aspect of dominance. Overall, PlanetLab 
has an increasing trend in dominance, measured by number of sites deploying its technologies, 
and also has the highest score in dominance of sites relative to the other three clusters except for 
the fact that ProtoGeni started out with more sites than PlanetLab at the beginning of Spiral 1.
Figure 3. ProtoGeni’s Adoption Rates
ProtoGeni:  The  above  graph  shows  ProtoGeni’s  dominance  in  projects  and  sites  in 
absolute and relative scores. ProtoGeni starts out with 11 sites in Spiral 1 and gains 23 new ones 
in Spiral 2, which reflects a 209% growth. In terms of relative scores, that is the highest level of 
growth in sites among the four clusters in Spiral 2. In absolute scores, ProtoGeni starts out with 
20% dominance in sites over the other three clusters in Spiral 1, increases to 33% dominance in 
Spiral 2, but drops to 21% in Spiral 3. Both in relative and absolute scores then, ProtoGeni has 
the highest level of dominance in Spiral 2 among the four clusters.
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In terms of new projects joining the GENI clusters, ProtoGeni starts out with an absolute 
score of 35% of dominance, and that  increases to 40.4% in Spiral 2. In both Spirals, those are 
the highest absolute scores of dominance among the four clusters. In relative terms, however, the 
new projects that join ProtoGeni in Spiral 2 reflect a 137% growth, which is the second highest  
score (after  ORCA’s 140% relative growth in projects  in  Spiral  2).  In Spiral  3,  9 new sites 
deploy ProtoGeni technologies, which is a 27% growth from Spiral 2. That is lower than both 
ORCA’s  and  PlanetLab’s  relative  growth  in  sites  in  Spiral  3.  Similarly,  in  absolute  terms, 
ProtoGeni  also  has  a  lower  dominance  score in  Spiral  3,  21%, than  ORCA and PlanetLab. 
Overall, ProtoGeni seems to have a decreasing trend in dominance of both sites and projects in 
Spiral 3 despite its highest scores in Spiral 2.
Figure 4. ORCA's Adoption Rates
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ORCA: The above graph shows ORCA’s adoption rates in projects and sites. In Spiral 1, ORCA 
starts out with the same number of sites as ProtoGeni (11), but gains fewer new sites in Spiral 2 
(13), which is a 118% growth. In absolute terms, however, ORCA remains stable, at the same 
level of dominance over the other clusters, 20.4%, from Spiral 1 to Spiral 2. In terms of new 
projects, ORCA has the highest growth among the four clusters as it starts with 5 projects and 
gains 7 new ones in Spiral 2, which is 140% growth. In absolute terms, this reflects an increase 
from 21.7% to 25.5% dominance over the other three clusters.
In Spiral 3, 34 new sites deploy ORCA’s technologies, which is a growth of 142% from 
Spiral 2. This is a lower growth score than PlanetLab but higher than ProtoGeni’s for the same 
spiral. Overall, while ORCA doesn’t “dominate” PlanetLab and ProtoGeni, it has an increasing 
trend in dominance in sites and in projects, both in relative growth scores and in absolute scores.
Figure 5. ORBIT's Adoption Rates
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ORBIT: The above graph shows ORBIT’s adoption rates in projects and sites. ORBIT 
starts out with the highest number of sites in GENI, 17, but doesn’t gain any new sites in Spiral 
2, neither in Spiral 3. In absolute scores, that reflects a decrease in dominance from 31.5% in 
Spiral 1, to 16.4% in Spiral 2, to 8.4 % in Spiral 3. In terms of new projects, ORBIT starts out 
with 3 projects in Spiral 1 and gains only 1 new project in Spiral 2, which is a relative growth of  
33%. In absolute  scores,  that  reflects  a  decrease  in  dominance  from 13% to  8.5%. Overall, 
ORBIT has a decreasing trend in dominance of projects and sites despite starting out with the 
highest number of sites.
In summary, ORBIT has the highest absolute number of sites and ProtoGeni the highest 
absolute number of projects in Spiral 1. In Spiral 2, ORCA has the greatest growth in projects 
and ProtoGeni the highest absolute score of dominance in sites. In Spiral 3, PlanetLab has the 
highest growth in sites and the highest absolute score of dominance. 
65
7.2 PATH DEPENDENCE
A timeline of development-related incidents is shown in table 9, indicating the time and type of 
incident (event, activity, decision), and its source in the dataset. The timeline presents a series of 
incidents related to GENI’s development, starting from the earliest noted event that led to the 
creation of Emulab (a precursor system of PlanetLab and ProtoGeni) up until the end of Spiral 
Three. 
Table  10 shows the  timeline  with additional  coding of  incidents  into  self-reinforcing 
mechanisms that should in theory make technology adoption path-dependent according to Sydow 
et  al  (2009).  As in the timeline  (table  9),  each incident  in table  10 is  an event,  decision or 
activity, and also is coded as a mechanism that promoted or inhibited path dependence. That 
way, the timing and sequence of events that promoted or inhibited the creation of a path of 
adoption can be considered for each cluster.
 The coded incidents are also arranged in a flowchart showing GENI’s timeline of events, 
activities and decisions along with the self-reinforcing mechanisms (figure 6). Each band in the 
graph represents a cluster and shows the sequence of development-related events, activities or 
decisions that reinforced or inhibited the creation of adoption paths. Arrows link those incidents 
that were explicitly connected in the data, by being mentioned as such by interviewees or in 
messages in the developers’ listserv. Incidents that were not explicitly connected but for which a 
relationship can be inferred indirectly from the data are presented without arrows. Each incident 
is labeled with its code that corresponds to the same incident in table 10, e.g., T1 is the first  
triggering  event  and  it  is  placed  in  PlanetLab’s  band  in  the  flowchart  because  it  involved 
scientists and other participants that would later create PlanetLab.  Some events that involve two 
clusters are placed in both bands, e.g. the integration of PlanetLab and ORCA was a decision 
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made  by  developers  of  both  clusters  so  a  box  representing  that  decision  is  placed  in  both 
PlanetLab’s and ORCA’s band in the flowchart. Those incidents that inhibited or counteracted 
the development  of an adoption path are  marked in blue (e.g.,  all  integration  efforts),  while 
incidents that led to potential or actual inefficiencies (according to Sydow’s et al framework) are 
marked in red.
As is shown in the flowchart, an adoption path emerges for some clusters during certain 
periods but not for all clusters and not consistently throughout the time examined in the data 
(2001-2011). For example, a path of adoption emerges for PlanetLab during the period preceding 
the design of GENI until the end of Spiral One. That path starts with two “triggering” events, 
labeled T1 and T2 in the flowchart that establish the need for a large-scale infrastructure system 
to support research in networking. The two triggering events led to the creation of Emulab and 
PlanetLab. By 2002, PlanetLab had already been adopted by several research projects, starting 
with Princeton’s, which made coordination of research efforts and coordination of management 
of the overall cyber-infrastructure more effective (creating thus “coordination effects” according 
to  Sydow et  al’s  terminology).  Those  are  shown in  the  flowchart  as  CO9.   The  effects  of 
improved coordination led to project investigators choosing to work with PlanetLab repeatedly a 
number of times and drawing more new users (creating a “persistent” choice according to Sydow 
et al. 2009 (P5a and P5b in the flowchart). 
During Spiral One, PlanetLab continues to have a path of adoption, as its already large 
user base expands through promotion efforts of its technologies by PlanetLab developers and 
administrators  (EXP19  in  the  flowchart).  At  the  same,  developers  with  prior  experience  in 
PlanetLab have an advantage over developers in other clusters that are just starting to design 
their cluster technologies or need to modify them to make them usable. That creates “learning 
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effects” in Sydow et al’s terminology (L17 in the flowchart) that further reinforces PlanetLab’s 
adoption and success in  gaining new users and grant  funding. After Spiral  One, it  is  not as 
obvious  that  PlanetLab’s  adoption  proceeded  according  to  a  “path”  or  a  clear  trajectory  of 
interrelated events, activities and decisions. 
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Table 9. GENI Timeline
Entry 
Number
Year Cluster Event/Activity/Decision Source
1 2002 PlanetLab PlanetLab created Interview with GENI funder
2 2003 ORCA Paper called “sharp” co-authored with 
[colleagues was published]. ORCA is a 
derivative of that”
ORCA developer /PI
3 2006 --- GENI project announced with a ~$370 
million budget through the year 2013
http://groups.geni.net/geni/attachment/w
iki/OldGPGDesignDocuments/GDD-
06-07.pdf
4 2006  ORCA “GENI specing out control framework ideas 
– aligned with where ORCA is going”
ORCA developer /PI
5 2007  --- “BBN Technologies, an advanced 
technologies solutions firm, announced today 
it has been selected by the National Science 
Foundation to serve as the project office for 
the Global Environment for Network 
Innovations (GENI), responsible for 
managing the planning and design of an 
advanced network facility spanning the 
United States”.
http://www.bbn.com/news_and_events/
press_releases/2007_press_releases/pr_
may_21_2007_geni
6 2007 GENI-wide “The GENI Project Office (GPO) announced 
today that it is actively soliciting proposals to 
help design GENI and begin its prototyping 
efforts.”
http://www.bbn.com/news_and_events/
press_releases/2007_press_releases/pr_g
eni_121807
7 2007 ORBIT “ORBIT  wireless  testbed  project  has  own 
community of users”
ORBIT developers /Pis
8 2007 ORCA [ORCA  team]  “so  disconnected  they  just 
spent time to learn about each other”
ORCA developer /PI
9 2009 ProtoGeni “The  ProtoGeni  team  at  the  University  of 
Utah  has  built  a  prototype  GENI  control 
framework,  complete  with  software  and  a 
wide range of hardware.” 
http://www.geni.net/?p=1246
10 2009 PlanetLab GENI  wrapper   customized  for   EntGENI 
[EntGeni is ahead in development]
http://www.openflowswitch.org/wk/inde
x.php/GENILight
11 2009 PlanetLab, 
ORBIT
PlanetLab, ORBIT integration http://groups.geni.net/geni/attachment/w
iki/ORBIT/ORBIT_PL_integration_rep
ort_9.08.pdf
12 2009 PlanetLab, 
ORCA
Gush structured  to work with both 
PlanetLab   and ORCA
http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/2009-
March/000042.html
13 2009 ORCA Had  to  spend  last  1.5  years  [2009-2010] 
modifying to fit GENI. Not at all as mature 
as PG & PL
GENI Project office manager
14 2009 ORCA, IMF When GENI Spiral  2 came out,  decided to ORCA developer /PI
69
transition  FIND grant  into GENI effort  to 
create GENI IMF
15 2009 ORCA, 
LEARN
The Learn Project was without a cluster and 
saw  Ilia’s  presentation,  and  said  let’s  join 
that one
ORCA developer /PI
16 2009 ProtoGeni In the second round, our cluster grew the 
most. It’s pretty visible that we’re building 
something that works”
ProtoGeni developer /PI
17 2009 ORCA, Plab, 
ProtoGeni
“Plab and Pgeni have a user base, T shirts, 
promotion, marketing.”.”Plaband ProtoGeni 
created an entire community – NSDI 
conference – could not do that style of 
research without Plab or PG”…[ORCA has] 
no established testbed with users, no armies 
of engineers”
ORCA developer /PI
18 2009 ORBIT Activity/claim: “Experimenters  need  to 
know very  little to use ORBIT” 
http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/2009
March/000045.html
19 2010 ProtoGeni Decision: GENI will use “ProtoGeni Rspec 
V2 as the format on the wire, Aggregates can 
use Translators to convert between formats”
http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/2011-
April/000270.html
20 2010 ORCA $12M [available] for the meso-scale 
experiments – ORCA Pis didn’t know 
anything [about it]…. It was in a presentation 
from Chip. Stanford group tied in very 
powerful at NSF – put in GENI proposal to 
BBN via the back door”
ORCA developer /PI
21 2010-
2011
PlanetLab, 
ProtoGeni
“Trying to merge PG and PL because similar 
…were developed based on the same 
architecture document”
GENI project office manager
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Table 10. Mechanisms Driving Path Dependence
Construct Cluster Quote Description (action,  
event, decision)
Source
T1 Triggering 
event
  
  --
Initial need for “network-
wide peer to peer 
solutions”
Event Interview respondent – GENI 
project manager
T2 Triggering 
event
PlanetLab “[developer/scientist 
was] hired in 1998 – 
wanted to do large scale 
research in networks – 
but couldn’t get 
published. No method, 
no tools. Plab and 
Emulab created to 
facilitate this. Those 
tools created and people 
jumped on them like 
“fleas on a dog”.
Event Interview respondent   -ORCA 
developer /PI
P3 Persistence ProtoGeni “didn’t have a good 
understanding of the 
Control Frameworks. It 
was semi random that 
[I]chose Pgeni
Example of “semi-
random” event 
leading up to Pgeni’s 
adoption
Interview respondent –ProtoGeni 
developer
P4 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning
PlanetLab “[developer/PI] brought 
up Emulab long time 
before virtualization 
things, grew as needed (8 
years already)”
Activities (emulab’s 
development)
Interview respondent –Emulab 
developer
P5 Persistence ProtoGeni “Independently of GENI 
they  wanted  to  use 
emulab  so  had  already 
gone down that path” 
Event (emulab 
already built) 
Interview respondent –ProtoGeni 
developer
L6 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning
ProtoGeni “In Spiral 1 – people 
already working with 
our cluster – many had 
their own emulab 
installations, some have 
now created their own. 
In Spiral 2, brought in 
new collaborators”
Decision Interview respondent –ProtoGeni 
developer/PI
CO7 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-coord.
PlanetLab [in  2003  Intel  and  HP] 
“put together consortium 
for PlanetLab….. and put 
Plab  all  over  the  place. 
Did  more  and  more 
projects on Plab.
Events Interview  respondent   -  PlanetLab 
developer
P8 Persistence ORCA “we started doing 
infrastructure as a service 
Decisions: ORCA is 
not being 
Interview respondent – ORCA 
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in 2001, That was a 
research project, smaller, 
didn’t get as many 
grants, no users”
selected/adopted by 
users and not a 
priority for funding 
agencies early on
developer /PI
CO9 Self-reinf. 
mechanism 
–coord.
PlanetLab [PlanetLab  was] “up and 
running at Princeton by 
Fall of 2002. All that 
stuff built and then 
institutionalized it so it 
was too late for people to 
wreck it”
Activity Interview respondent  - PlanetLab 
developer
CO10 Self-reinf. 
mechanism 
(learning, 
coord)
ProtoGeni “We’ve developed this 
emulab software [for 10 
yrs now]–We naturally 
became the center of 
this”
Past actions leading 
to ProtoGeni’s 
dominance
Interview respondent- ProtoGeni 
developer/PI
P11 Persistence PlanetLab “Emulab/Plab had large 
user communities before 
BBN in the arena”  
Past event(s) leading 
to PlanetLab’s 
dominance
Interview respondent – GENI 
project manager
IN12 Potentially 
inefficient 
choice
ProtoGeni [I] had been working 
with Vinnie at Princeton 
[PlanetLab]…submitted 
the spiral thing but was 
put in cluster B (i.e., 
ProtoGeni). PI (from 
PlanetLab) called me and 
said why are you in B, 
you’ve been working 
with us. It didn’t make 
sense” 
Decision Interview respondent –ProtoGeni 
developer
IN13 Potentially 
inefficient 
choice
ORBIT “80% of ORBIT was 
from before… Most 
users are ORBIT users 
not GENI…. Our 
existing user community 
doesn’t feel a need for 
anything beyond what 
[they] already have”
Event/decision: 80% 
ORBIT users came 
from before GENI/ 
locked-in to ORBIT 
before other 
projects/options 
became available
Interview respondents –ORBIT Pis
IN14 Potentially 
inefficient 
choice
PlanetLab “We started down that 
path with Vini  ... We 
made this available to 
researchers, but they 
didn’t come running.”
Activity/decisions 
(VINI testbed, Pl)
Interview respondent  - GENI 
project manager
IN15 Potentially 
inefficient 
choice
ProtoGeni “we picked ProtoGeni 
because we were assured 
that integration was as 
painless as possible – this 
Decision proved 
inefficient
Interview respondent- ProtoGeni 
developer
72
turned out not to be true”
IN16 Potentially 
inefficient 
choice
ORCA [in 2010 funding 
available / opportunity] 
“$12M for the meso-
scale experiments – 
ORCA Pis didn’t know 
anything [about it]”
Decision (funding 
decision inefficient as 
it excludes one 
framework – ORCA 
hasn’t heard about 
the funding 
opportunity. Without 
funding, fewer 
projects/opportunities 
for prospective 
users/adopters/develo
pers/experimenters 
Interview respondent – ORCA 
developer /PI
L17 Self-reinf.
mechanism 
learning 
effects
PlanetLab “we got a small grant to 
do enterpriseGENI from 
GPO – before we do 
large nationwide GENI 
let’s see if we can do it 
on a campus… Wrote 
another proposal to GPO 
– now that we can do it 
on our campus, why not 
do it on other campuses 
as well”
Activity/series of 
activities
Interview respondent – PlanetLab 
developer/PI
L18 Self-reinf. 
mechanism 
-learning 
ORBIT “OMF tools and software 
are not tied to a specific 
testbed technology. 
Indeed, OMF has been 
deployed and maintained 
on multiple testbeds with 
many different types of 
technologies”
Activity: this should 
reduce /prevent path 
dependence (prior to 
2007)
http://ORBITlab.org/wiki/Document
ation/OML#ForExperimenters
http://omf.mytestbed.net/wiki/omf/I
ntroduction
EXP1
9
Self-reinf. 
mechanism
expectation
PlanetLab
ProtoGeni
“Plab and Pgeni have a 
user base, T shirts, 
promotion, marketing”
Activities: Plab and 
Pgeni promote their 
technologies, can 
influence users’ 
expectations, 
ORCA developer /PI
CO20 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-coord.
PlanetLab
ProtoGeni
“Now Trying to merge 
PG and PL because [they 
are] similar... were 
developed based on the 
same architecture 
document”
Activity (funding and 
management of the 
similar 2 clusters 
more efficient for 
GPO)
Interview respondent  - GENI 
project manager
CO21 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-coord.
ORCA “in 1st year [ORCA 
developers] so 
disconnected they just 
Events: Coordination 
setbacks in ORCA
Interview respondent – ORCA 
developer /PI
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spent time to learn about 
each other”
L22 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
- learning
ORCA “We wanted to find a 
cluster to fit in – and we 
found ORCA (D) – they 
have a BEN network in 
North Carolina that fits 
us. Keren found the 
cluster to join. Came up 
with unified 
measurement framework 
to connect into that 
cluster. Last summer we 
started the IMF and 
LEARN projects in 
Spiral 2. ERM, IMF and 
LEARN – there are lots 
of overlaps among the 
projects”
Decisions Interview respondent  - ORCA 
developer /PI
L23 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
ProtoGeni
PlanetLab
“The GPO has just 
completed and posted an 
initial draft of “GENI 
Aggregate Manager API 
v1.0”.ThisAPI represents 
convergence of interface 
designs used by the 
PlanetLab and ProtoGeni 
control framework 
projects.  Once those 
projects have completed 
their migration to the 
API, any aggregate that 
supports this API will be 
interoperable with both.”
Event (this should 
reduce path 
dependence since 
same API can be 
used in both clusters)
http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/20
10-September/000165.html
L24 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
PlanetLab
ORBIT
“The proxy enables 
PlanetLab users to 
include ORBIT nodes in 
their experiments. 
PlanetLab users can log 
into their slivers and start 
their experiments.”
Activity:   PlanetLab, 
ORBIT integration, 
http://groups.geni.net/geni/attachme
nt/wiki/ORBIT/ORBIT_PL_integrat
ion_report_9.08.pdf
L25 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
PlanetLab “PlanetLab is an 
excellent example of an 
‘AM’ which hosts 
multiple services 
(Codeen, OpenChord?) 
which other 
experimenters rely on. 
Obviously, everyone can 
roll their own 
management API, but 
why couldn’t they re-use 
one (and all its 
infrastructure) if there is 
one, especially for 
environments which need 
to make resource 
allocation decisions and 
Activity (PlanetLab’s 
AM code can be 
reused)
http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/20
10-September/000177.html
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where some form of 
resource accounting is 
necessary.”
L26 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
ORCA “The ORCA framework 
is designed to be 
substrate-independent, … 
Substrate independence 
ensures that the control 
framework is generic”
Activity https://geni-ORCA.renci.org/ORCA-
doc/current/guides/devel/substrate.ht
ml
L27 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
ORBIT “Experimenters  need  to 
know  very  little to 
use ORBIT “
Activity http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/20
09-March/000045.html
L28 Self-reinf. 
mechanism
-learning 
ORBIT, 
ORCA
“User-Defined 
Experiments for DOME 
Systems Supporting 
WiMAX. We are adding 
WiMAX 4G clients to 
some of the DOME 
buses and installing a 
WiMAX base station on 
the Umass campus”
Event, activity 
(ORBIT, ORCA 
interoperate) 
http://geni.cs.umass.edu/dome/docs.
php
L29 Self-reinf. 
mechanism 
-learning 
PlanetLab 
ORCA
ORCA- GUSH 
Integration
Activity http://lists.geni.net/pipermail/dev/20
09-March/000042.html
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Figure 6. GENI’s Development Timeline
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According to path-dependence theory, and to the framework proposed for organizational 
path dependence by Sydow et al (2009), a path is initiated by certain “triggering” events that 
promote  or  motivate  the  technology’s  adoption.  In  GENI’s  case,  participants  identified  two 
related  triggering  events  leading  to  the  creation  of  Emulab (T1 and T2 in the  flowchart):  a 
research  lab’s  or  researcher’s  need  for  large-scale  network  infrastructure  and  later  on,  the 
recognition  of  that  need  by  the  wider  academic  community  and  GENI’s  funding  agency: 
“[scientist  I.V. was] hired in 1998 – wanted to do large scale research in networks  but couldn’t 
get published. No method, no tools. PlanetLab and Emulab were created to facilitate this. Those 
tools created and people jumped on them like “fleas on a dog” (interview respondent’s note, T2 
in table 10). 
In addition, path-dependence creates potential and/or eventually actual inefficiencies as 
the result of repeated adoption decisions. In theory, inefficiency could be created by the adopted 
technology’s sub-optimal design and the availability in the market of superior alternatives which 
repeated and widespread adoption of the dominant technology makes costly or impossible (e.g., 
QWERTY keyboard design). Sydow et al (2009) point out that while inefficiencies are easily 
detected in retrospect, after a design or a technology has become dominant in the market, they 
are not as easily detected at  the outset during the technology’s  introduction or development. 
They propose that since organizational decisions and practices are not easily characterized as 
completely (in)efficient but can be both in different aspects or increase/decrease in efficiency 
over time, potential not actual inefficiency should be a sufficient characteristic to distinguish a 
path-dependent process (and to also predict one prospectively rather than retrospectively). 
The  period  preceding  GENI’s  development  does  not  include  any  potential  or  actual 
inefficiencies (either decisions or activities). All four clusters have a pre-existing technology or 
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theoretical design on which their subsequent development is based (in the flowchart those are 
P5a for PlanetLab, P5b for ProtoGeni, P8a for ORCA, and L18 for ORBIT). The availability of 
multiple alternative designs for GENI even prior to its conception can in theory mitigate the risks 
of  developing  a  large-scale  cyber-infrastructure  based  on  a  single  design  and  the  risks  of 
investing  in  its  development.  If  a design were to  prove unworkable,  an alternative  could be 
selected from the pre-existing options and be built upon or expanded, minimizing the likelihood 
of failure or the need for additional funding to develop completely new designs. Even though 
that would prevent GENI’s development from becoming path-dependent on a single design and 
thus ‘inefficient’, it does not necessarily prevent the clusters themselves from becoming path-
dependent,  that  is,  it  might  prevent   path-dependence  at  the  level  of  GENI  (the  overall 
infrastructure) but not at the cluster level. 
All four clusters were based on a single pre-existing technology which sometimes seemed 
the “natural” choice for them (respondent’s note in CO10 in table10) and it is unclear what 
alternative options their developers considered. In some cases developers had little knowledge of 
cyber-infrastructure technologies: as a ProtoGeni respondent mentioned “[I] didn’t have a good 
understanding of the Control Frameworks. It was semi random that [I]chose ProtoGeni” (P3 in 
table 10). Other developers’ choices were pre-determined by past experience even before all 
four alternatives had been available: “Independently of GENI they wanted to use Emulab so had 
already gone down that path”, “We’ve developed this emulab software [for 10 yrs now]–We 
naturally became the center of this” (ProtoGeni developer, CO10 in table 10). 
While  none of the above observations  indicate  any actual  downsides or inefficiencies 
with  developers’  choices,  the  manner  in  which  the  choices  were  made,  with  limited 
consideration of alternatives suggest that they could create or lead to potential inefficiencies in 
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the future. The scale and complexity of the infrastructure technology itself creates “sunk costs” 
early one for its developers and users in terms of specialized expertise required to build the 
system, and time and effort needed to modify or adapt it for different research purposes. As 
ProtoGeni and PlanetLab were both based on the same pre-existing technology, Emulab, any 
potential  failure,  lack  of  fit  or  unworkable  mechanism  in  Emulab  would  have  had  to  be 
addressed by both clusters,  increasing  the potential  costs  of such efforts  for both developer 
teams. 
Similarly, ORCA was based on a single research project, “SHARP”, pre-dating GENI 
while  choices  were  also  limited  by  the  highly  specialized  nature  of  its  technology  (optical 
systems). While none of those events were actual downsides for its developers, the fact that its 
development started on a given path in a field with a narrow focus such as optical networks 
could  in  theory  make  it  path-dependent  and  irreversible  once  alternative  options  became 
available and its developers could work with multiple systems (e.g, as ORCA integrated with 
other clusters in later Spirals). 
ORBIT’s  development  was  also  based  on pre-existing  technologies,  in  fact  “80% of 
ORBIT was from before” GENI as its PIs have noted (IN13 in the flowchart). That could lock-in 
its users to ORBIT even at the outset of GENI, and make switching or deploying other systems 
too costly for its project teams, much like Emulab and ORCA’s initial project success could 
prove a limiting choice for its developers at a later time.
While  early technology choices  made by cluster developers could only be considered 
potentially and partially inefficient, certain decisions made subsequently at the project level led 
to  actual  inefficiencies.  For  example,  some  projects  based  on  early  PlanetLab  technologies 
misestimated its usefulness to prospective adopters: “We started down that path with Vini – We 
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made this available to researchers, but they didn’t come running” (project manager’s note, IN14 
in  table  10).  Management’s   decisions  sometimes  were  inefficient  or  perceived  as  such for 
developers themselves: a PlanetLab developer seeking funding during Spiral One was assigned 
to  the ProtoGeni  cluster,  removing thus a  PlanetLab contributor  from his team and creating 
dissatisfaction for both the individual and the PlanetLab team: “[I] had been working with VINI 
[testbed]  at  Princeton  [PlanetLab]…but  was  put  in  cluster  B  (i.e.,  ProtoGeni).[PI]  from 
PlanetLab called me and said why are you in B, you’ve been working with us. It didn’t make 
sense” (ProtoGeni developer, IN12 in table 10). Finally, a cluster’s technologies could prove 
inefficient at later stages of development (e.g., Spiral Two) despite its early history, progress and 
visibility:  as  a  developer  notes,  his  project’s  choice  of  ProtoGeni  was  driven by unrealistic 
expectations:  “we  picked  PG  because  we  were  assured  that  integration  was  as  painless  as 
possible – this turned out not to be true” (IN15 in table 10).
The above examples  suggest that  technology adoption decisions were sometimes less 
than optimal  for the developers  and their  project  teams,  but  do not indicate  the presence of 
systematic inefficiency by anyone of GENI’s project participants or managers. They seem to be 
instead isolated decisions that collectively created setbacks for GENI but their impact did not 
extend beyond their clusters. Nevertheless, at the cluster level, their potential and actual effects 
often could persist throughout the Spirals despite that cluster’s increasing adoption, or were not 
sufficiently  powerful  to  influence  a  cluster’s  adoption  trajectory,  which  suggests  that  that 
adoption  had  been  path-dependent  on  the  cluster’s  early  history.  Misguided  expectations, 
changes in a project’s development team (moving developers across clusters) and lack of interest 
in a technology have long-lasting effects on a cluster’s internal coordination processes and its 
visibility and legitimacy in the scientific community. Developers and project managers need to 
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invest additional time and effort to counteract those effects, which might involve re-directing 
resources across projects, spending time modifying code and falling behind schedule, changing 
project plans and the project’s direction of development. Overall, the presence of potential and 
actually inefficient decisions is consistent with path-dependence theory, and some clusters such 
as PlanetLab and ProtoGeni have become dominant despite such decisions. However, since their 
decision-making cannot be characterized as systematically or predominantly inefficient, its effect 
on adoption and their  dominance was likely weak or less powerful than that of the learning, 
coordination and promotion effects that can make adoption path-dependent.
In  addition  to  the  presence  of  inefficient  decisions,  path  dependent  adoption  is 
characterized by the persistence of choices that lead to a technology’s dominance. By definition, 
an  adoption  “path”  consists  of  the  repeated  selection  of  a  certain  technology  or  cluster  by 
developers,  managers  or  funding  agents  supporting  its  development.  Evidence  for  repeated 
adoption  decisions  includes  Emulab’s  persistent  use  and  deployment  by  ProtoGeni  and 
PlanetLab projects (P5a, P5b in the flowchart); the option to use its code was available since its 
creation in 2001, and that option became an actual decision soon thereafter (by PlanetLab in 
2002) and repeatedly by both cluster’s Spiral One and Spiral Two projects. Similarly, ORBIT’s 
trajectory of adoption was formed by repeated adoption decisions over time, as 80% of its Spiral 
Three users had adopted its systems prior to Spiral One. Finally, the technical overlap of some of 
ORCA’s newer projects (L22b in the flowchart) despite its lack of users early on indicates an 
increased or sustained adoption rate during Spiral Two, in which ORCA grows in projects more 
than any other cluster. In summary, evidence for path-dependence in the adoption or dominance 
of certain GENI clusters exists to some extent in terms of potentially inefficient decision-making 
and  in  terms  of  persistent  technology  adoption  choices  made  by  developers  and  project 
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managers. As no exact measure or amount of such decisions or adoption choices exists or is 
proposed in the literature, it is difficult to determine whether the evidence in the GENI case is 
sufficient to establish the presence of path dependence; rather, path dependence is the result of 
subjective interpretation which limits its explanatory power of the clusters’ different adoption 
rates.
7.2.1 Mechanisms Driving Path Dependence
Pre-GENI (2001-2006)
As shown in GENI’s timeline, PlanetLab is the oldest and has the longest history of all GENI 
clusters. It was created in 2002 based on the design and architecture of an earlier infrastructure, 
Emulab.  While  both  ProtoGeni  and  PlanetLab  are  based  on  Emulab,  and  while  some  of 
ProtoGeni’s  developers  had also been working on Emulab,  PlanetLab  was built  earlier  than 
ProtoGeni. This series of developments, starting with a lab’s (or researcher’s) need for large-
scale  infrastructure  in  1998,  then  spreading  among  other  academic  researchers  and  funding 
agencies  and  leading  to  Emulab’s  creation,  then  to  PlanetLab’s  design  and  becoming 
progressively more popular among researchers was a path that led to PlanetLab’s high adoption 
rates at the beginning of GENI. 
For  a  system’s  adoption  to  be  considered  path-dependent,  certain  self-reinforcing 
mechanisms need to exist that could motivate its adoption in ways that early adoption decisions 
would “reinforce” subsequent ones made by potential users, developers and other supporters or 
stakeholders.  That  way,  its  adoption  over  time  can  be  considered  “self-reinforced”  and  its 
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development path dependent  on early adoption decisions.  One such mechanism, proposed in 
theory by Sydow et al (2009) and also identified by interview respondents is coordination. As 
mentioned earlier, coordination refers to the existence of certain practices, rules, or routines that 
are adopted by multiple individuals or organizations in a field, and as they are replicated over 
time, new entrants to that field are more likely to conform to them and also adopt them because 
of their popularity. The fact that a practice has been chosen by the majority of players in a field 
reduces  the  coordination  costs  among them and among  potential  entrants  into  that  field.  In 
theory,  coordination  effects  can pull  a technology’s adoption toward a certain direction in a 
consistent manner so that an adoption trajectory emerges that makes that technology’s adoption 
seem path-dependent (Sydow et al. 2009). 
In the case of PlanetLab, the existence of a single cyber-infrastructure (Emulab) prior to 
its creation,  and the successful deployment and adoption of that infrastructure by researchers 
across  institutions  facilitated  the “coordination”  among its  developers  and potential  users  by 
functioning like a standard, or a common design tested by Emulab’s adopters. Researchers who 
wished to use a large-scale infrastructure for new projects could use Emulab’s tested design, 
could share resources with other PlanetLab users, or collaborate with PlanetLab’s developers to 
modify and improve its  design.  The absence of Emulab or the existence  of multiple  similar 
systems at the time that PlanetLab was introduced would have created increased coordination 
costs among developers wishing to collaborate, share resources, or start new projects based on a 
reliable  infrastructure.  At  the  same time,  industry  support  also  functioned  as  a  coordination 
mechanism, making PlanetLab more attractive and a more efficient choice for potential adopters 
who could have the support of PlanetLab’s consortium that Intel and HP had helped create. Intel 
and HP, through that consortium, “put PlanetLab all over the place” and “did more and more 
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projects” on it as noted by an interview respondent (CO7 in table 10). Their support, along with 
Emulab’s pre-existing user-base helped expand PlanetLab substantially before GENI was even 
conceived by funding agencies and developers themselves.
In addition to coordination, another mechanism that gave PlanetLab sustained advantage 
and helped “build” a path of adoption over time was the learning advantage of its developers 
created by Emulab. The fact that PlanetLab was based on Emulab’s specifications and overall 
architecture made it easier for those experienced with Emulab to work with PlanetLab’s code 
without having to gain expertise in a different kind of technology. With  Emulab at its core, new 
features  and  resources  could  be  easier  added  onto  PlanetLab  depending  on  the  needs  of 
researchers,  making  it  more  usable  or  attractive  to  new  adopters.  Those  two  mechanisms, 
learning and coordination, could have promoted or “reinforced” PlanetLab’s adoption over time, 
making its adoption trajectory path-dependent even prior to GENI’s introduction.
Spiral One (2007-2009)
Learning and coordination effects for PlanetLab persisted during Spiral One, as more projects 
based on it  could benefit  from developers’  ongoing support  and their  coordinated  efforts  to 
modify, expand and improve its technologies. Spiral  One projects whose developers had had 
experience  with  PlanetLab,  such  as  EnterprizeGENI,  gained  sustained  funding  and  quickly 
expanded  across  US universities  (L17 in  table  10 and in  the  flowchart).  At  the  same time, 
PlanetLab  developers  had  repeated  opportunities  to  present  their  projects  in  the  GENI 
conferences  (EXP19  in  the  flowchart).  PlanetLab  projects  collectively  had  the  strongest 
presentations during Spiral One in terms of demonstrating or describing the advantages of their 
technologies (they used technical and usefulness frames in their presentations more so than the 
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rest tree clusters). Promoting the projects and their technologies increases their  visibility and 
builds legitimacy among prospective adopters, a social influence effect that can, in theory, attract 
new users or experimenters to PlanetLab. 
Sydow et al (2009) and theories of network effects suggest that such social influence can 
be a powerful mechanism driving the adoption of a technology by creating expectations among 
new  users  (or  at  least  those  exposed  to  social  influence  effects)  that  the  technology  being 
promoted will  become popular  and possibly dominate the market  or the field in which they 
operate.  Irrespective  of  its  actual  advantages  over  competing  technologies,  the  one  being 
promoted, advertised or presented in an effective manner, might eventually become popular and 
dominate the market because its sustained promotion leads individuals to expect that it is or will 
be adopted by others, thus motivating them to adopt it themselves.  Sydow et al (2009) use the 
term  “adaptive  expectations”  to  describe  this  effect,  indicating  that  individuals’  and 
organization’s expectations can change over time and “adapt” in response to social influence. A 
technology’s adoption then can become path-dependent as new users are swayed by promotion 
events  and  by  a  technology’s  visibility,  and  adapt  their  expectations  (or  form  favorable 
expectations)  regarding its  advantages  over time.  Repeated promotions,  increased advertising 
and in general events that are designed to influence prospective users can predict the formation 
of  a  “path”  of  increasing  adoption  despite  the  availability  of  competing  technologies  in  the 
market.
Despite the effects of coordination, learning and social influence, PlanetLab was not the 
dominant cluster by the end of Spiral One (2009). ProtoGeni had by that time more projects than 
any of the rest three clusters, thus “dominating” GENI in terms of projects, and ORBIT was also 
dominating GENI in terms of sites deploying GENI technologies. A possible explanation for 
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ProtoGeni’s  dominance  according  to  path-dependence  theory  is  that  similarly  to  PlanetLab, 
ProtoGeni was also subject to the influence of multiple  self-reinforcing mechanisms such as 
learning,  coordination  and  expectations  management.  Its  developers  had  extensive  prior 
experience  with  Emulab  before  GENI which  lowered  the  learning  barriers  to  working with 
ProtoGeni technologies;  as a developer and project investigator noted, in Spiral  One “people 
[were] already working with our cluster – many had their own Emulab installations” (L6 in table 
10).   ProtoGeni  developers  also had opportunities  to  present  and promote  their  projects  and 
technologies at multiple GENI conferences (GECs); in fact,  their  presentations seem to have 
been  strongest  compared  to  the  other  clusters’  in  terms  of  demonstrating  or  explaining  the 
usefulness  of  their  technologies  (ProtoGeni  projects  had  collectively  the  most  ‘usefulness’ 
frames) during Spiral One. At the same time, ProtoGeni developers made significantly greater 
efforts to promote their cluster with “T shirts, promotion, marketing” (EXP19 in table 10 and in 
the flowchart) while the other clusters did not invest in such marketing strategies beyond their 
conference  presentations.  Moreover,  ProtoGeni,  like  PlanetLab,  had  substantial  coordination 
advantages  driving  its  adoption  as  its  developers  had  been  “already  working  with  our 
[ProtoGeni] cluster – many had their own emulab installations” before the start of Spiral One 
(developer’s  note,  L6).  A  common  infrastructure  design  facilitated  resource  sharing, 
collaboration and modifications to the code so that prospective adopters could  effectively use 
ProtoGeni’s technology and easily coordinate with current developers who had been working 
with that cluster’s code for ten years. 
The  effects  of  coordination,  learning  and  expectations  management  could  in  theory 
explain  ProtoGeni’s  dominance  of  GENI  projects  during  Spiral  One  (assessed  in  absolute 
counts). Starting with its developers’ work on Emulab ten years prior to Spiral One and their 
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decision to build ProtoGeni based on Emulab’s code, and then continuing through their repeated 
demonstrations of ProtoGeni’s usefulness to a wide audience, a path of increasing adoption (or 
diffusion) emerges from 2001 to 2009 leading up to ProtoGeni’s dominance at the end of Spiral 
One.  Path  dependence,  however,  can  only  partially  hold  during  Spiral  One,  as  ProtoGeni 
dominates  GENI only in terms of projects  (the largest  share of GENI sites  is  using ORBIT 
technologies during Spiral One).
Similar to PlanetLab and ProtoGeni, ORBIT had an early start and its own community of 
users before the start of Spiral One in 2007. For example, OMF, a project whose code was later 
used by the rest of the clusters, was originally an ORBIT technology (adopted first by developers 
that  later  built  ORBIT,  L18 in  table  10  and in  the  flowchart).  According to  its  developers,  
ORBIT and OMF were purposely built in a way that makes them easily deployable (“OMF tools 
and software are not tied to a specific testbed technology. Indeed, OMF has been deployed and 
maintained on multiple testbeds with many different types of technologies”, developer’s note in 
GENI listserv, L18 in table 10). Moreover, ORBIT required little prior experience in wireless 
networking  from  experimenters  as  well:  “experimenters  need  to  know  very  little  to  use 
ORBIT”(developer’s   note).  These  observations  suggest  that  ORBIT would  dominate  GENI 
during Spiral One, its adoption driven by learning and coordination effects on prospective users. 
The results  indicate  that  while  it  has the largest share of sites deploying GENI technologies 
(31%),  it  is  not  similarly  dominant  in  terms  of  projects  (ProtoGeni  has  the  largest  share  of 
projects during that period). That suggests that path-dependence can only partially explain the 
emergence of a dominant cluster during Spiral One. 
Overall,  while  path  dependence  is  a  plausible  explanation  for  the  dominance  results 
during Spiral One, it does not seem to be a strong one since, as mentioned above, no single 
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cluster emerges as dominant for both projects and sites, and in addition, it can also apply to 
PlanetLab (which is not the dominant cluster in Spiral One). PlanetLab, is however, the second 
most dominant cluster for that period, with a relatively small difference between its share of 
projects  and sites  from that  of  the dominant  clusters  (ProtoGeni  is  5% more dominant  than 
PlanetLab in terms of projects and ORBIT is 3% more dominant in terms of sites). That suggests  
that  while  path-dependence  does  not  exclusively  explain  the  dominance  of  ProtoGeni  and 
ORBIT in Spiral One, it has a partial explanatory value for the dominance of the first two most 
dominant clusters considered together.
Spiral Two (2009-2010)
In  contrast  to  Spiral  One,  a  single  dominant  cluster  emerges  in  Spiral  Two  (2009-2010). 
ProtoGeni has the largest share of both projects  and sites in GENI (measured in absolute % 
adoption)  and also  the  greatest  growth in  sites  relative  to  its  adoption  or  dominance  in  the 
previous  Spiral.  This  is  not a  complete  dominance,  at  least  not  in relative  growth terms,  as 
ORCA has the greatest growth in projects relative to its adoption in Spiral One (the difference in 
their growth rates is however small, as ORCA grows by 140% while ProtoGeni grows by 137%). 
Mechanisms  that  might  explain  ProtoGeni’s  dominance  are,  similar  to  Spiral  One, 
learning effects due to its deployment of Emulab code since the beginning of its construction, 
and potential  coordination effects  persisting through the two Spirals (even though there isn’t 
much evidence of new coordination effects different from those of Spiral One). The effects of 
expectations management (EXP19 in the flowchart and in table 10) also persist as ProtoGeni 
developers make new presentations and demonstrations of their projects (ProtoGeni and ORCA 
have the strongest, or potentially most influential, presentations during Spiral Two in terms of 
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the  way  they  frame  their  technologies).  Nevertheless,  as  there  are  no  new  coordination  or 
learning mechanisms in Spiral Two acting on ProtoGeni’s users, path-dependence theory would 
suggest  that  its  dominance  was  driven  by  repeated  promotion  activities  (creating  favorable 
expectations) and by its early, pre-GENI, history: events such as Emulab’s development and 
decisions to base its design on Emulab might have created sustained coordination and learning 
effects with a long-lasting influence through Spiral Two.
ORCA’s growth in projects during Spiral Two, the largest among all clusters (140% from 
its  Spiral  One  share  of  projects),  can  be  better  explained  by  its  developers’  activities  and 
decisions  during the  same period  than by its  early  history.  Several  new projects  that  joined 
ORCA in Spiral Two (IMF, LEARN, ERM: L22b in the flowchart and in table 10) had overlaps 
in their code as their PIs had decided to use the same base of ORCA/BEN core technology built 
in Spiral One. That decision, together with earlier decisions to keep ORCA’s code generic (L26 
in the flowchart) lowered any potential learning barriers for new adopters. At the same time, 
ORCA and PlanetLab are integrated during Spiral Two, which makes it easier, or more efficient, 
for PlanetLab users to also use ORCA’s technologies (and vice versa). ORCA also integrated its 
systems with ORBIT’s (L28 in the flowchart and in table 10), which similarly facilitates the 
adoption of both clusters by each other’s users. Integration activities eventually lead to the two 
clusters’ being able to deploy each other’s technologies, giving thus a learning advantage to their 
developers and prospective adopters over those of non-integrated clusters. ORCA’s integration 
with other clusters, together with its developers’ conscious efforts to create overlaps across some 
of its projects might explain its having the greatest growth in projects during Spiral Two. 
Nevertheless,  if  path  dependence  is  to  be  considered a  highly likely  explanation,  the 
“path” of events, activities and decisions driving ORCA’s adoption would be relatively short, 
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covering mostly Spiral Two, as ORCA’s early history does not promote the creation of such a 
path. ORCA’s team was not well coordinated during Spiral One, spending over a year making 
changes to the code, while having decided to make ORCA generic enough to work with multiple 
technologies. The developers’ coordination problems, and the fact that ORCA started out without 
a user community that could potentially support new adopters, discourage or delay adoption, and 
rather than create a path, would act as path-breakers for as long as their effects persist. Spiral  
One, then, would be unlikely to be dominated by ORCA, which is the case in the results, and 
ORCA’s dominance in Spiral Two’s would be limited or mitigated by the lingering effects of 
Spiral One (lack of funding and the generic quality of its technologies). 
At  the same time,  the integration  strategy might  not  just  draw new users from other 
clusters,  but  also  limit  the  extent  to  which  those  clusters’  adoption  is  path  dependent.  Path 
dependence  implies  that  users  are  “locked” in  a  particular  technology because the option of 
adopting an alternative one is inefficient or impossible. The integration of clusters could counter-
act or prevent such lock-in because technically,  it  expands the options for the users of those 
clusters that can use each other’s code (it gives them an additional option). From the perspective 
of path-dependence theory, integration might increase the adoption of a technology (or cluster) 
but it does not necessarily make that adoption path-dependent but rather, can actually ‘break’ the 
adoption path and expand the choice of technologies for some users. On the other hand, lock-in 
is still possible; considered together as a composite system, the integrated clusters can lock-in 
their  users  much  like  a  single  technology  or  cluster  can  create  lock-in.  Depending  on  the 
presence of self-reinforcing mechanisms, and on whether those act similarly on both clusters at 
the same time, the adoption of the integrated clusters can in theory become path-dependent. 
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That, however, is not the case with ORCA since the Spiral One mechanisms acting on its 
users  (generic  code,  overlap  among  some  projects)  are  unique  to  that  cluster,  while  new 
mechanisms that could potentially increase its adoption do not necessarily create lock-in for all 
users  (integration).  Overall,  path  dependence  can  only  partially  explain  the  dominance  or 
adoption results of Spiral Two: the lingering effects of learning and expectations management 
can create a path of adoption extending ProtoGeni’s dominance in Spiral One to Spiral Two. 
ORCA’s dominance however, has a short-term path starting and ending with Spiral Two and 
would not affect all users similarly because its integration with other clusters can expand rather 
than limit the technology choices.
Spiral Three (2010 - 2011)
Integration as a strategy, while being driven by GENI’s funding agency and project managers, is 
ultimately  determined by the clusters’  development  teams and their  willingness  to overcome 
technical and coordination/collaboration barriers to achieve that goal.  As a result,  integration 
proceeds at a different pace in different clusters; PlanetLab, most likely because of its longer 
history and advanced stage, is more effective, or faster, in leading integration efforts. That, in 
theory, would give it an advantage over ProtoGeni in attracting users (and prospective adopters) 
from other  clusters,  but  it  does  not  make it  the  dominant  cluster  at  the end of  Spiral  Two. 
Integration activities might instead have longer-term impact, influencing adoption during Spiral 
Three, as PlanetLab emerges as the dominant cluster at the end of that period. That, however, 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  path-dependence  theory  explains  its  dominance,  since,  as 
mentioned earlier,  integration can lock-in new adopters to the integrated clusters as a whole 
while expanding the current users’ choices (by creating the option of an additional cluster). 
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Path  dependence  could  help  explain  PlanetLab’s  dominance  in  Spiral  Three  only  by 
considering that cluster’s early history. Self-reinforcing mechanisms present in its early stages of 
development would have to also be active during Spiral Three or their effects should persist until 
the end of Spiral Three. Coordination and learning effects that led to PlanetLab’s dominance 
prior  to Spiral  One could have persisted through Spiral  Three even though they were likely 
limited by the projects’ increasing social and technical complexity: the addition of new members 
to  the  development  team and experimenters  that  would need to  coordinate  their  efforts,  the 
complexity of the technology itself as new projects join the cluster and as PlanetLab is being 
modified  to  fit  new sites  and to  interoperate  with  other  clusters,  and changes  in  policies  or 
management practices by the management team and funding agency. On the other hand, those 
socio-technical issues would affect all clusters, however PlanetLab only was dominant among 
them, which suggests that its earliest adoption path might have had lingering effects on Spiral 
Three, counter-acting more recent developments, at least in terms of sites deploying GENI (as 
GENI did not have any new projects funded during that time). 
In summary, the assumptions of path dependence theory must hold for the researcher to 
“assert” path dependence; if one or more of the assumptions do not hold that indicates that there 
might be a better explanation for the phenomenon than path dependence. For example, if there 
are  two  or  more  technologies  with  similar  widespread  adoption,  then  there  is  no  single 
technology that “dominates” the field. Sydow  et al (2009) note that path dependence does not 
have to lead to dominance,  in other words a technology can have a path-dependent adoption 
trajectory that leads to its becoming less popular. If there is dispute about which technology is 
dominant,  then path  dependence  can still  hold  independently  of  the outcome as  long as  the 
adoption history of the technology the theory refers to satisfies the four assumptions in theory. In 
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the case of GENI PlanetLab’s adoption was path-dependent early on and its adoption history 
satisfied the assumptions (or necessary conditions) proposed in theory by Sydow et al (2009). 
ProtoGeni  also  had  a  path-dependent  adoption  history  up  to  Spiral  Two  and  the  theory’s 
necessary  conditions  were  present  during  that  time  frame.  The  implication  is  that  path-
dependence theory seems to hold and also lead to dominance rather than lack of dominance, but 
only for the two largest clusters.
Overall, path dependence is a partial or weak explanation for the entire period considered 
in the present study, starting around 2001 and ending in 2011 at the closing of Spiral Three. 
While  an  adoption  path  seems  to  exist  for  PlanetLab  and  is  consistent  with  its  widespread 
adoption prior to Spiral One, no concrete data exist showing the exact extent of its adoption 
before Spiral One. Starting in Spiral One, that adoption path becomes less clear as PlanetLab 
becomes second most-dominant cluster after ProtoGeni in projects and ORBIT in sites. GENI’s 
dominance  by any single  cluster  becomes  less  path-dependent  in  Spirals  Two and Three  as 
similar  self-reinforcing  mechanisms  act  on  PlanetLab  and  ProtoGeni  (large  user  base,  early 
learning and coordination advantages, user expectations) and to a lesser extent on ORCA and 
ORBIT. While learning effects also benefit ORCA and ORBIT they are deliberately created by 
their development teams and build over time, as opposed to PlanetLab and ProtoGeni’s early 
reliance on a widely used infrastructure (Emulab). 
Similarly, technology promotion events and activities occur repeatedly, and all clusters 
attempt to influence user expectations. ProtoGeni developers make a greater effort to present 
their cluster as useful (in addition to being technically advanced), which might have reinforced 
ProtoGeni’s advantage throughout all three Spirals. ProtoGeni is dominant in Spirals One and 
Two. An adoption path for it  could have started with Emulab’s creation,  continuing through 
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decisions to base its projects on Emulab, the expansion of its use base and promotion activities 
during GECs leading to ProtoGeni’s dominance at the end of Spiral Two. The adoption path 
becomes even less clear after that, as no new self-reinforcing mechanisms act on it (or any other 
cluster). PlanetLab’s dominance in Spiral Three could have been predicted by early events and 
decisions prior to Spiral One, but not by any recent developments during the last two Spirals. 
Early history, then, might predict and explain dominance but only partially (or approximately) 
and its predictive and explanatory power decreases over time.
7.3 PROJECT PERFORMANCE
The results  of the project  performance hypothesis  are  shown on table  11.  In Spiral  One the 
ProtoGeni cluster has the highest score in project performance (94.8%), followed by PlanetLab 
(88.8%), ORBIT (80%), and ORCA (61.3%). In Spiral Two, PlanetLab has the highest score in 
project performance (65%), followed by ORCA (52.3%), followed by ProtoGeni (16.6%), and 
ORBIT which has negative score (-16%), indicating that that cluster has not made any progress 
in its milestones but rather has fallen behind in its development.
The project performance hypothesis suggested that a cluster’s project performance will 
positively influence its dominance over other clusters in the following Spiral. That hypothesis 
was evaluated by examining the four clusters’ adherence to milestones, that is, the number of 
milestones that each cluster reached on time or early minus the number of milestones that they 
had missed or  met  late.  Each cluster  has  a  score of  project  performance that  represents  the 
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number of on-time or early milestones minus the number of late milestones. Higher scores reflect 
superior project performance.
The results show a pattern that supports this hypothesis for some clusters but not all. The 
clusters  with  the  highest  dominance  scores  in  Spiral  Two  (ProtoGeni  with  209%  relative 
dominance  in  sites,  137% relative  dominance  in  projects,  33% absolute  dominance  in  sites, 
40.5% absolute dominance in projects) and Spiral 3 (PlanetLab with 193% absolute dominance 
in sites, 42% relative dominance in sites)  also had the highest performance in the preceding 
Spirals (ProtoGeni had reached 94.8% of its milestones in Spiral One; PlanetLab reached 65% of 
its milestones in Spiral Two). 
However, the positive relationship between performance and dominance does not hold 
for the second most dominant cluster in Spiral Two (ORCA is the second most dominant cluster 
in Spiral Two but did not have the second-best project performance in Spiral One: 61.3%, lower 
than  PlanetLab’s  88.8%).  Similarly,  the  second-best  performing  project  in  Spiral  Two 
(PlanetLab, with 65% reached milestones) is not the second-most dominant but rather the most 
dominant  cluster  in  Spiral  Three.  Furthermore,  the cluster  with the third  highest  Spiral  One 
performance (80%, ORBIT) is not the third most dominant cluster in Spiral Two, and the cluster 
with the worst performance in Spiral One (61.3%, ORCA) is not the least dominant cluster in 
Spiral Two. 
Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  project  performance  during  a  Spiral  alone  does  not 
explain  variation  in  all  the  cluster’s  subsequent  adoption.  Superior  project  performance  is 
positively  associated  with  dominance  only  in  the  case  of  the  top  two  dominant  clusters 
(ProtoGeni and PlanetLab). Low-performing clusters (ORBIT and ORCA) have low dominance 
in the subsequent Spirals but not in a consistent manner. 
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In addition, project performance does not explain variation in adoption and dominance 
when its effects are related to adoption and dominance in the same time period. During Spiral 
One PlanetLab had the highest project performance but ProtoGeni and ORCA emerged as the 
dominant cluster at the end of Spiral One. Moreover, ORCA had the lowest project performance 
but  contrary  to  the  second  hypothesis  it  emerged  as  the  dominant  cluster  together  with 
ProtoGeni.  During  Spiral  Two,  PlanetLab  again  had  the  highest  performance  scores  but 
ProtoGeni was dominant at the end of that Spiral.
Other  factors  might  be  at  play  influencing  technological  dominance  besides  the 
development  teams’ ability  to meet  milestones.  One such factor  might  be the cluster’s  prior 
adoption rates, such that adoption rates in Spiral One influence adoption rates in Spiral Two. The 
results,  however,  support  this  alternative  explanation  only  partially:  whereas  ProtoGeni  and 
ORCA  increased  their  adoption  rates  in  Spiral  Two,  PlanetLab  and  ORBIT  had  decreased 
adoption rates in Spiral Two.
Another interesting observation in this  data is  that  all  clusters have decreased project 
performance in Spiral Two compared to their Spiral One performance. The leading cluster in 
Spiral One, ProtoGeni, shows deterioration in its performance from 94.8% to 16.6%. The largest 
difference in performance between the two spirals is that of ORBIT’s, who initially had an 80% 
score but then stopped making progress and fell behind by 16% in its development schedule. A 
likely reason for this trend across all clusters is the fact that in Spiral Two new projects joined all 
clusters, and those new projects might have slowed down the development of the cluster that 
they joined. A second likely reason is that the development goals had changed in Spiral Two, 
emphasizing  integration  across  the  technologies  rather  than  just  incremental  development. 
Whereas  all  clusters  had  managed  to  perform  well  in  their  own  development,  when  they 
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attempted to make their technologies compatible with those of other clusters they started missing 
milestones and falling behind schedule.
Table 11. Project Performance Results
Spiral 1
GENI Cluster
Cluster B
PlanetLab
Cluster C
ProtoGeni
Cluster D
ORCA
Cluster E
ORBIT
Project
Performance
Milestones on Time 94.4% 97.4% 48.4% 30%
Late Milestones 5.6% 2.6% 19.4% 10%
Early Milestones 0% 0% 32.3% 60%
(OnTime+Early-
Late) Milestones
88.8% 94.8% 61.3% 80%
Spiral 2
GENI Cluster
Cluster B
PlanetLab
Cluster C
ProtoGeni
Cluster D
ORCA
Cluster E
ORBIT
Project
Performance
Milestones on 
Time
82.5% 52.8% 58.2% 29%
Late Milestones 17.5% 41.7% 23.8% 58%
Early Milestones 0% 5.5% 17.9% 13%
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(OnTime+Early-
Late) Milestones
65% 16.6% 52.3% 16%
7.4 SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
The results of the frame analysis for each cluster are presented in table 12. Each column includes 
the numbers of technical or use frames that each cluster used in a particular Spiral. For example,  
PlanetLab’s presentations, demos, and project documents (e.g., reports and slides) during Spiral 
One included 19 technical  frames  and 20 use  frames.  The presentations,  demos and project 
documents  that  PlanetLab  developers  created  in  Spiral  2  included  13  technical  and  10  use 
frames.
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Table 12. Technical and Use Frames for each Cluster 
 
Technical
frames-
Spiral 1
Use frames-
Spiral 1 Total
 –Spiral 1
Technical 
frames-
Spiral 2
Use frames-
Spiral 2 Total-
Spiral 2
PlanetLab 19 20 39 13 10 23
ProtoGeni 8 24 32 29 28 57
ORCA 18 8 26 41 33 74
ORBIT 9 4 13 5 1 6
Total
  
54 56 110 88 72 160
In Spiral 1, PlanetLab is the cluster that used the greatest number of frames in its presentations, 
demos, and descriptions of its systems and technologies. However, contrary to H3, PlanetLab is 
not the dominant cluster in Spiral 2, neither in terms of projects nor in terms of sites deploying 
its technologies. Instead, ProtoGeni dominates the other clusters in terms of absolute number of 
new projects  and new sites  in  Spiral  2.  ProtoGeni  also  has  a  high  number  of  frames in  its 
presentations, higher than those of ORCA and ORBIT but not as high as those of PlanetLab. 
With the exception of ProtoGeni, there is a reverse trend for the rest three clusters to the one 
hypothesized in H3: high numbers of frames seem to be associated with lower dominance scores, 
and low numbers of frames with higher dominance scores.
If we examine the type of frames used by a cluster separately, based on whether a frame 
includes only a technical description of the cluster vs. a description of its possible uses and its 
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usefulness for experimenters and researchers, a different picture of the results emerges.  The 
number of technical frames is positively associated with growth in dominance in Spiral 2 for 
ORCA and ORBIT, but the inverse is true for PlanetLab and ProtoGeni. ProtoGeni dominates 
the other clusters in terms of relative growth in sites and in absolute terms, but its presentations 
of its systems have few technical frames. The cluster with the most technical frames, PlanetLab, 
has a high dominance relative to ORCA and ORBIT but does not dominate ProtoGeni.
The number of use frames (descriptions of the technology’s usefulness) is also 
inversely  related  to  a  cluster’s  subsequent  dominance  for  ORCA and PlanetLab  but  not  for 
ProtoGeni and ORBIT, both in terms of sites and projects. Similarly, ORCA’s and PlanetLab’s 
number of frames in Spiral 2 is inversely related to their relative dominance scores; that’s true 
for technical frames and for use frames. If we look at absolute dominance scores, however, the 
number of use frames is positively related to a cluster’s dominance in Spiral 2 for all clusters.
The social influence hypothesis is also not supported if we consider the impact of frames 
on adoption and dominance in the same time period instead of over time. During Spiral One 
PlanetLab has the highest number of frames but the dominant cluster at the end of Spiral One is 
ProtoGeni. ORBIT has the lowest number of frames but ORCA is the least dominant cluster at 
the end of Spiral One. Similarly, during Spiral Two, ORCA has the highest number of frames but 
ProtoGeni is the dominant cluster at the end of Spiral Two. 
Overall, each theory can explain only partially some of the clusters’ adoption rates and 
dominance, and only when the impact of the independent variables is examined over time across 
Spirals. None of the three theories completely explains any cluster’s adoption, instead, different 
processes seem to account for variation in adoption and dominance. Table 13 summarizes the 
results for each cluster.
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Table 13. Theory Fit for each Cluster
Path Dependence Project 
Management
Social Influence
Cluster B 
PlanetLab
Partially (pre-GENI, Spiral 
One, Spiral Three) 
Yes        No
Cluster C 
ProtoGeni
Partially (for Spiral One) Yes Partially (only for use 
frames in Spiral Two)
Cluster D 
ORCA
No No Partially (only for technical 
frames in Spiral Two)
Cluster E 
ORBIT
No No Partially (for technical and 
use frames in Spiral Two)
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8.0 DISCUSSION
This  study  examined  the  development  of  four  inter-related  cyber-infrastructure  systems  that 
comprise the GENI network. It focused on the question of why some of those systems (or their 
designs  which  are  under  development)  seem  to  dominate  others  in  terms  of  adoption  by 
developers and researchers. Three theories were identified based on the literature of technology 
adoption,  and  data  was  collected  and  analyzed  to  determine  whether  each  theory  had  any 
predictive power in suggesting which of the four systems might dominate others. 
The results regarding path dependence theory suggest that that theory can only partially 
explain variation in the four clusters’ adoption rates and dominance over time. While the theory 
suggests a positive impact of path dependence on adoption rates, the opposite trend emerged for 
some clusters, especially during the later development phase (Spiral 3). That shows that cluster 
developers and other project participants were able to maintain increased adoption rates over 
time  despite  the  fact  that  the  adoption  of  their  technologies  was  not  path  dependent.  Other 
factors,  such as social  influence,  might have promoted technology adoption over time as the 
effects of path dependence decreased.
Similarly, the project performance results suggest that superior project performance in the 
technology development efforts did not fully account for differences in the clusters’ adoption 
rates.  While  a  reverse  trend  seems  to  describe  the  development  of  ORBIT  projects,  which 
collectively  had decreasing  project  performance and decreasing adoption rates  over  time,  no 
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positive  relationship  between  project  performance  and  dominance  emerged  over  the  whole 
period of the three Spirals for any cluster. That indicates that project performance was not a 
driver of adoption or dominance, and that GENI clusters were able to increase adoption of their 
technologies regardless of the efficiency of their project management.
The findings related to the frame analysis  and the social  influence hypothesis  do not 
reveal any consistent patterns in the four clusters’ dominance in the period from which data was 
collected (Spirals 1 through 3, 2007-2011). That suggests that social influence alone, at least 
measured in terms of technology frames, did not account for the variation over time in the four 
clusters’ adoption or dominance. 
Overall, while none of the proposed theories completely explained variation in adoption 
rates across the four clusters over time, each had partial  explanatory value depending on the 
development stage (Spiral) and the cluster in which it was assessed. That suggests that additional 
factors  might  be  at  play,  such  as  the  cluster’s  size,  as  the  largest  clusters,  PlanetLab  and 
ProtoGeni, show similar trends.  The type of technology developed in each cluster might also be 
a driving factor,  as ORCA and ORBIT which developed more specialized types of networks 
(optical and wireless) had slower adoption rates. To examine the potential impact of such factors 
a larger sample size is needed so that cyber-infrastructure development projects can be reliably 
compared  along  dimensions  in  which  they  differ  while  also  belonging  to  the  same  overall 
framework like GENI.
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8.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
A general position of this study is that CI systems have dominant designs that reflect competing 
organizing  logics  to  which  stakeholders  ascribe.  While  there  are  multiple  theories  in  the  IS 
literature that could predict the emergence of dominant designs, their limitation to stand-alone, 
complete technologies that are already in the market does not make them easily generalizable to 
CI systems. This study’s consideration of three such theories in the context of competing CI 
systems can contribute to the research stream of dominant designs and IT adoption while also 
extending the literature of cyber-infrastructure studies with a comparative examination of four CI 
systems. More specific implications of this study are discussed in greater detail below in relation 
to each theory considered in the analysis.
8.1.1 IT adoption and dominance
This study considered dominance along the three Spirals of GENI’s development; if a shorter 
timeframe had been used to test the hypotheses, for example if the study had ended with Spiral 
Two, then the results would have been different. Without considering Spiral Three, PlanetLab 
will not re-emerge as the dominant cluster, as ProtoGeni was dominant at the end of Spiral Two. 
In  that  case,  path  dependence  theory  would  be  less  powerful  and  ProtoGeni’s  prior  social 
influence and project performance would seem to “break” PlanetLab’s initial dominance. That 
would suggest that those two theories have greater effects on adoption as they enabled another 
system to dominate PlanetLab, and the assumption would be that their effect would hold over 
time. Including Spiral Three in the analysis shows that we can’t assume that the effects of those 
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theories will hold over time, and that PlanetLab’s path dependence or at least early history had a 
lasting influence that enabled it to eventually re-emerge as the dominant cluster.
8.1.2 Path dependence
While the study’s findings do not suggest any significant or consistent influences on technology 
dominance over time, none of the theories can be rejected either, as each can partially account 
for differences in adoption rates at different times. More specifically, path dependence seems to 
have influenced the dominance of the two largest clusters and in the early stages of GENI’s 
development, while social influence seems to have had an influence in later stages for the smaller 
clusters and in earlier stages for the larger clusters. 
A contribution can be made to the research stream of dominant design in the IT adoption 
and diffusion literature. Empirical findings from past studies are generalizable in reference to an 
industry,  a  market  niche  or  a  single  organization.  Whether  those  findings  apply  to  inter-
organizational CI systems whose underlying design, such as the architecture or data model, is 
selected before the system is widely available for adoption and through multiple stakeholders’ 
inputs cannot be inferred from the existing literature. 
Consistent with findings in the IT adoption literature, this study shows that the adoption 
or dominance of inter-dependent, incomplete and large-scale cyber-infrastructure systems may 
depend on early events that set an adoption path like PlanetLab’s. Where CI systems differ from 
standard IS, and a contribution of this study, is that their incomplete, ongoing development and 
interdependence can counteract the effects of path dependence, especially as the systems become 
more integrated and interoperable over time. A dominant design for CI systems might emerge 
early on, as this study and the literature on IT adoption suggest, but its dominance might not 
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persist over time as the CI system is being developed, modified and integrated with competing 
systems. 
Moreover,  different  implications  can be drawn depending on the timeframe in which 
dominance is considered. When each Spiral is considered separately, different clusters seem to 
be  dominant  at  different  times.  That  implies  that  different  factors  or  social  processes  drive 
adoption in each stage of development. As a result, no single theory or social process can explain 
differences in adoption and dominance across clusters consistently over time. While theoretical 
frameworks  such  as  Sydow  et  al’s  (2009)  propose  various  processes  that  might  lead  to 
dominance, it is unclear from the theory whether those processes have effects that persist over 
time.  If  a technology emerges  as dominant  at  a  certain point  in time,  the assumption in the 
dominant  design  literature  is  that  it  should  continue  to  be  dominant  if  its  adoption  is  path 
dependent because according to path dependence theory early adoption leads to future adoption. 
This study’s findings do not support that assumption of persistent dominance over time, 
as different clusters were dominant in each Spiral. That implies that in the context of CI projects, 
predictions derived from the literature regarding dominance will need to be adjusted to take into 
account changes in dominance over time: additional social mechanisms and theories need to be 
identified that could cause such changes. 
A more general  implication is  that  the three theories  examined in this  study seem to 
interact in affecting adoption and dominance over time. This study considered three explanations 
of GENI’s development independently of each other, however it is possible that these theories 
interact  and their  combined effects  on adoption  might  have greater  explanatory  power.  Path 
dependence, in particular, might reinforce the effects of social influence theory in the sense that 
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developers  or  a  dominant  cluster  can  use  different  frames  to  prolong  their  technology’s 
dominance. 
Path  dependence  might  be  also  reinforced  or  sustained  through  superior  project 
performance:  Sydow  et  al  (2009)  propose  coordination  as  a  mechanism  reinforcing  path 
dependence  over time.  For example,  in  ProtoGeni’s  case,  presentations  and promotions  of a 
technology using different frames, and superior team performance together seem to have led to 
its dominance in Spiral 2.  These effects were short-term; in the longer term PlanetLab became 
dominant again (Spiral 3), so the interactive effects of team performance and framing might have 
a declining strength over time. 
While  there  is  a  such a  connection  between  project  performance  and  dominance  for 
PlanetLab and ProtoGeni, a closer look at their teams suggests that framing attempts were also 
influential in the adoption of those clusters. The combined effects of project performance and 
framing sustained high adoption rates for both clusters which suggests that dominance can be 
extended  or  sustained  over  time  through  better  team  coordination  and  different  technology 
frames.  Future studies can explore this  research avenue by examining development  teams of 
dominant and less dominant systems with variable project performance that also made attempts 
to influence their users through technology frames. Another avenue for future research involves 
considering  those  effects  at  different  time  frames  along a  system’s  adoption  trajectory.  The 
effects of project performance and framing independently or interactively might become less or 
more powerful in the long term. Future studies can identify factors or processes  that explain 
their decreasing or increasing effect on adoption as a system advances through spirals or other 
stages of development.
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In future studies, the theories of dominance and path dependence might need to include 
or be combined with social theories or mechanisms that can explain changes in dominance over 
time, or at least identify how path dependence ends and how long its effects should be expected 
to last. In this study, the integration of certain clusters seemed to increase their adoption while 
expanding the choices  of CI technologies  for the developers  of the integrated  clusters.  That 
strategy,  if  pursued  consistently  might  “break”  the  adoption  path  and  eventually  end  path 
dependence. That is a possible outcome in theory but cannot be inferred from the present results, 
rather,  more extensive studies will  need to  test  the persistence of path dependence  and how 
dominance may shift over time as a result of that.
When the period of the three Spirals is considered as a whole, including events predating 
GENI’s design (2001-2011), the same cluster that was dominant early on in 2002 (PlanetLab) 
emerges as the dominant design at the end of Spiral Three in 2011. That implies that dominance 
can be predicted by early history and that it persists in the longer term even though it might shift 
in the intervening years between the earliest presence of a CI design (PlanetLab in 2002) and the 
time of the study (PlanetLab is dominant again in 2011). That implication however is more likely 
to be a unique characteristic of GENI and a result of the timeframe chosen for the current study 
rather  than a generalizable statement.  A future study with different start  and end dates,  e.g., 
considering a shorter timeframe or a timeframe extending beyond 2011 will not necessarily have 
the same finding. The value of examining a system’s development over time is in the fact that 
different  mechanisms and shifts  in  adoption  can be considered at  multiple  points  in  time as 
opposed to considering only the start and end dates of the CI’s development project.
As mentioned earlier, studies in technology adoption and diffusion have typically focused 
on systems that are complete in their development, small scale and stand-alone but not on cyber-
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infrastructure systems that are large-scale, incomplete as scientists begin to use them while they 
are being developed and expanded, and have a complex structure by including hardware, large 
scale  databases,  and  equipment  used  by  research  scientists.  The  findings  suggest  that  path 
dependence  theory  might  not  fully  apply  to  cyber-infrastructure  systems,  even  though  early 
events  in  a  system’s  development  trajectory  have a  powerful  impact  in  its  adoption  at  later 
stages. Early history still matters, but not necessarily or not completely in the way specified by 
path dependence theory. As early events prior to a CI system’s design prepare the ground for a 
path of decisions or actions that might make its adoption dependent on that path, other factors 
and processes, specific to CI systems can counteract the effects of early events. 
Path dependence can be counteracted or prevented by social influence tactics and efforts 
made  by  the  system’s  developers,  funders,  managers  and  other  stakeholders  to  increase  its 
visibility and gain legitimacy among scientists. Sydow et al (2009) discuss how decision paths 
can  be  changed  or  stopped  by  “path  breakers”,  events  or  intentional  actions  taken  by  an 
organization’s members to adapt long-established decision-making patterns or routines to better 
serve  the  organization.  This  study’s  findings  suggest  that  such  path-breaking  actions  might 
involve social influence: developers can play an active role in breaking or altering an adoption 
path  by  to  promoting  their  projects  and  technologies  and  managing  the  expectations  of 
prospective adopters. Past studies of path dependence typically did not consider the role that 
developers or project managers of a technology might play in forming or breaking an adoption 
path since their focus was on complete systems. An adoption path began forming only after a  
system’s  development  was  finished  and  after  that  system  had  entered  the  marketplace  and 
competed with similar technologies. Participants in the system’s design and development could 
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not influence the adoption path; it was only users or other adopters that through their buying 
decisions could choose to switch to another system or keep using the current one. 
An additional implication of the present study then is that developers and other project 
participants can set an adoption path through early design decisions and efforts to not only build 
a technically advanced system but also to promote its visibility even while the system is under 
development. Cyber-infrastructure systems are a good site for examining how path dependence 
might interact with other social processes to affect adoption patterns, and how developers and 
other  project  participants  can actively influence the adoption path before the system is  fully 
developed. Future studies in this line of research can focus specifically on the role of developers 
or other system stakeholders and examine additional factors or social processes beyond social 
influence that might interact with path dependence. 
New studies can also focus on the role of other kinds of users besides developers and 
project managers, such as CIOs or educators who might have different expectations from cyber-
infrastructure systems (e.g., users who would only adopt a CI system after it reaches production 
quality  rather  than during its  experimental  or early development  stage).  Past  studies  of  path 
dependence tended to assume that a technology’s user base was homogenous, and that users 
made a binary adopt/reject decision that led to the formation of an adoption path. CI systems 
offer an opportunity to examine the motivations and adoption decisions of a diverse group of 
users, who might have different needs, motives and expectations, and whose adoption decisions 
at different times during the system’s development might have variable impacts on its adoption 
path.
Further,  cyber-infrastructure  systems that  share  a  management  structure  like  the  four 
clusters in GENI might be a good setting for comparative studies of path dependence theory and 
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for identifying additional self-reinforcing mechanisms in addition to those suggested by Sydow 
et al (2009) and also for identifying counteracting forces to their effects, such as the integration 
strategies of the GENI clusters. The theoretical framework proposed by Sydow et al (2009) has 
not been empirically tested yet, so new studies could examine its fit to various kinds of cyber-
infrastructure  systems,  and  potentially  identify  additional  mechanisms  that  sustain  or  break 
technology adoption paths. 
More  specifically,  in  the  present  study,  system integration  as  a  coordinated  strategy 
seemed to inhibit the formation of an adoption path in the short term (during Spirals 2 and 3). If 
the effects of systems integration are examined in longer term periods they might not necessarily 
work against the formation of an adoption path. Future studies can focus on different kinds of 
technology strategies such as systems integration, and examine their impact in the longer term. 
That way additional mechanisms, and more specifically technical aspects specific to CI systems 
can be identified that promote or “break” the formation of adoption paths.
8.1.3 Project Performance
With regard to the project performance results, this study could potentially make a contribution 
to research on project management in cyber-infrastructure and more generally IS development 
projects. Past studies of project management aspects of standard IT systems have shown that 
project  management  imposes  significant  costs  to  the  development  effort  and  that  systems 
maintenance involves long term costs and can have significant impacts to the organization’s IT 
strategy. The present study considered only one aspect of project management, the development 
team’s success in meeting project milestones. An examination of additional aspects of project 
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management that includes multiple performance indicators besides met milestones would be a 
more comprehensive test of the project management hypothesis.
The adoption rates of low-performing CI clusters were not influenced by the cluster’s 
project performance; project performance led to increased dominance only in the case of the two 
highest-performing clusters (PlanetLab, ProtoGeni).  That suggests that project performance does 
not determine the competition among CI systems but rather it only has a partial impact on those 
systems  with  superior  project  performance  in  their  design  and  development  efforts.   Low-
performing CI development teams that seek to increase their system’s competitiveness might be 
more effective by focusing on different  factors that  promote adoption more directly  such as 
building a user community, promoting the system consistently and managing user expectations. 
While met milestones did not completely influence the adoption and dominance of all clusters 
during all Spirals, additional aspects of project management might have a greater impact when 
considered in a comprehensive manner. Future studies can focus on multiple aspects of project 
management, both technical such as the development team’s project management approach, and 
social such as the role of project leaders or project managers in influencing team dynamics. 
8.1.4 Social influence and frames
The focus on frame analysis  represents one only approach of understanding the fit  of social 
influence  theory  on  technology  adoption.  Other  aspects  of  social  influence,  such  as  social 
identity  dynamics  among scientists  and other  stakeholders,  might  play  a  role  in  influencing 
adoption and dominance.  Moreover, the present study identified two kinds of frames (use and 
technical) that were consistent with Orlikowski and Gash’s (1994) study. New kinds of frames 
might  be identified  in  future studies  by examining multiple  modes of  technology promotion 
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discourse besides presentations, demos and written materials (e.g., visual or interactive media 
presentations of CI projects, or presentations specifically designed for educators vs. researchers). 
Given the diversity  of potential  adopters  and stakeholders  of CI systems, an examination  of 
various promotion efforts specifically targeted to different audiences could make both a research 
and practical contribution to the study of social influence and adoption of CI systems. 
Future studies can also complement the present analysis of frames by examining not only 
the presence of frames but also changes in frames over time, how frames are constructed in the 
first  place,  and how they are shared and interpreted by groups of developers and users. The 
impact  of  frame  dynamics  can  then  be  examined  on  different  stages  of  the  CI  system’s 
development or on phenomena that have a significant socio-cognitive aspect and have not yet 
been studied in the context of CI systems, such as escalation of commitment to failing projects 
(Newman and Sabherwal, 1996), and power dynamics (Markus 1983; Newman and Nobel 1990).
8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Developing  large-scale  cyber-infrastructure  systems  is  a  time-consuming  and  challenging 
process that involves diverse stakeholders, multiple user groups, and inter-related technologies 
that  are  dispersed  across  different  labs  in  academia  or  in  some  cases  in  the  industry. 
Understanding the problems and success factors in the development of such systems is similarly 
challenging because of the scale of the systems involved and the diversity of the participants. 
This study represents only an initial attempt to understand four such systems in a comparative 
case study context. Further studies of CI systems are needed in order to derive ‘lessons learned’  
that can be generalized to multiple kinds of CI development cases. 
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The practical implications of the current study, such as understanding how developers of 
CI systems frame the technologies that they develop and how differences in framing  affect the 
technology’s  subsequent  adoption  or  dominance  might  be  useful  to  project  managers  and 
developers of CI systems. As the findings of the social influence hypothesis suggest, the manner 
of  presentation  can  make  a  difference  in  a  system’s  later  adoption.  Practically,  the  framing 
analysis suggests that presentations and in general promotion of CI systems are more effective 
when  they  include  information  about  the  system’s  usability  and  usefulness  to  current  and 
prospective users. 
Some clusters,  such as  ProtoGeni,  also  presented  certain  technologies  as  solutions  to 
existing  problems in the scientific  community  or  among system developers.  Framing a new 
system as a solution to a recognizable problem, or more generally emphasizing its usefulness for 
scientists, educators and students, seems to be an effective strategy and should be a practical 
concern for members of the development team. Developers and other project members should be 
consistently interacting with current users not only for the purposes of identifying  technical 
problems and usability issues but also for discovering  new possible uses of the CI technologies 
and different  ways in which they can be useful to various user groups (e.g.,  researchers vs. 
educators). That will enable them to better promote certain technologies that are part of a CI 
system and make the case for their value to different audiences. Framing the CI system as a 
useful  tool  in  multiple  ways,  together  with more technical  demonstrations  can build interest 
among a wider range of users and eventually increase its adoption and popularity.
 Coordinated  promotion  efforts  can  affect  adoption  as  early  as  Spiral  One  (e.g.,  for 
PlanetLab and ProtoGeni). Developers and other members of the project team can increase their 
system’s  visibility  and  the  chances  of  adoption  even  in  early  stages  of  its  development. 
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Practically,  that  implies  that  rather  than  focusing  team  efforts  and  resources  exclusively  to 
technical aspects of the development and management of their project, team members should be 
also actively working to promote their  system and engage in community-building efforts for 
prospective users. User support is typically considered a secondary concern for developers and 
managers of conventional IT systems, however for CI systems user support is a central part of 
the development project, as ProtoGeni and PlanetLab’s promotion efforts show. Building a user 
community, forming a consortium for users or informally supporting users in gaining expertise in 
a  new technology  should  not  follow the  development  process  and begin  after  a  system has 
reached production quality, rather, should begin as early as the design or Spiral One stage to 
ensure sustained interest in the new technology.
Overall,  the antecedents and drivers of adoption examined in this study suggest that a 
greater focus on the social aspects of the development of CI systems can be an effective strategy 
for  generating  interest  and  increasing  their  adoption.  Practically  that  implies  that  designers, 
developers and other members of CI project teams have an influential role beyond their technical 
tasks;  managers  and  project  leaders  will  need  to  devise  strategies  to  help  developers  take 
advantage of their potential  to influence the system’s adoption. The typical way of assigning 
tasks and responsibilities by dividing the technical component of the development work from the 
social one might not be the most effective way to influence its adoption. Developers who engage 
in  both  kinds  of  tasks,  technical  and  social,  in  parallel  might  find  out  that  they  are  more 
successful  in  generating  interest  for  their  system among  prospective  users.  Standard  project 
management techniques might thus not be the best fit for CI projects; new approaches that either 
combine current techniques or adapt them to the CI’s context will need to be devised by project  
managers and leaders with the goal of having a sustained impact on the system’s adoption.
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9.0 LIMITATIONS
The single focus on GENI and the method of this study place limitations on the results that can 
be drawn from the analysis. Additional studies are needed to examine diverse CI systems, and 
with  additional  methods  (e.g.,  social  network  analysis)  in  order  to  triangulate  this  study’s 
findings. The study’s findings are limited mainly by its methodological approach and its small 
sample  size.  Limitations  that  are  common  in  qualitative  studies,  such  as  researcher  bias  in 
interpreting  results,  selective  reporting  of  observations  by  interview  respondents,  and  the 
recording and documentation  of events,  decisions  and activities  by project  participants  (e.g., 
meeting notes and progress reports archived in the GENI wiki) are all present in this study and 
limit the reliability of the findings. In addition, the small sample size limits the generalizability 
of  the  findings  to  other  cyber-infrastructure  development  projects  that  do  not  share  GENI’s 
social and technical characteristics, method of development and funding structure. To increase 
the reliability and generalizability of the present study’s findings, a larger sample of projects is 
needed  that  have  a  common  management  structure  like  GENI’s  support  of  four  alternative 
cluster  technologies,  while  varying  in  their  adoption  rates,  development  history,  and  social 
influence of prospective adopters.
In addition,  a limitation  associated  with the data  sources is  the fact  that  the archival 
materials  and  other  online  documents  have  been  selected  by  the  project  participants  to  be 
included in the project websites and in the GENI wiki. Other documentation and information that 
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is not available online might be missing from the analysis. Similarly, the presentations in the 
GENI conferences are invited, by the GPO, and missing data from projects that were not invited 
to  create  demos and presentations  cannot  be included in the analysis. Those limitations  and 
research biases can be mitigated by grounding interpretations in theoretical frameworks and by 
stating any conceptual or methodological assumptions that were made between data collection, 
analysis and their connection to constructs and theories in the literature.
Moreover, path dependence assumes that the competing systems are similar to the extent 
that one can replace the other, and that users can choose either of them but not both or all of 
them at the same time without significant costs. The fact that ORBIT is a wireless technology 
and the other three systems are not is a limitation of the study; ORBIT might be practically 
comparable  to  the  other  three  systems  in  that  they  all  support  large  scale  network 
experimentation but in theory and specifically in terms of path dependence theory it might not be 
comparable to them. 
Another  limitation  of  this  study  is  that  the  role  of  industry  stakeholders  was  not 
examined. Industry participants played a role in GENI’s development since the earliest stages, 
prior to Spiral One and before GENI was even conceptualized. HP helped organize a consortium 
of  Emulab  users  in  2003 which  led  to  PlanetLab’s  having  the  advantage  of  a  user  support 
community at the beginning of its development in 2007. The role of the industry however is not 
mentioned in later project reports and presentations that were archived during the four cluster’' 
development, which is a limitation of the study. Industry participants can exert social influence 
on prospective adopters by promoting certain technologies, by integrating some of their own pre-
existing technologies into a cluster, and by providing funding and user support as HP did early 
on. ORCA’s partnering with IBM might have increased ORCA’s adoption rates in Spiral 3, and 
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generally industry support as social influence would be expected to increase the adoption rates of 
the technology/cluster they are partnering with. However, PlanetLab still emerged as a dominant 
technology having greater adoption than ORCA during Spiral 3 which suggests that industry 
support in ORCA’s case didn’t “break” PlanetLab’s adoption path.
This study also did not examine the influence of exogenous factors as the focus was on 
how factors and processes internal to the GENI teams during development affect dominance. 
Possible exogenous influences on adoption include:
a) the  support  that  development  teams received  from the  project  management  office 
throughout  GENI’s  development  and changes  in  team structure  and  membership. 
Those factors can affect a team’s ability  to meet project milestones  and affect  its 
performance, which it turn might influence adoption indirectly. Resources and other 
forms of support can speed development, or hinder it if they are mismanaged, which 
in turn can influence the team’s ability to meet its milestones. That might explain the 
ORBIT team’s  declining  performance:  lack  of  funding for  equipment  could  have 
hindered development and as such the team fell behind in its development schedule. 
In  theory,  lack  of  resources  would  hinder  development  and  decrease  team 
performance, and ultimately impact adoption.
b) The  existence  of  technologies  such  as  OpenFlow  which  are  compatible  with  all 
clusters but not integrated equally across all clusters. That might give an advantage to 
clusters that can integrate and expand to include such technologies and as a result 
increase their user base.
c) The stage of development of each cluster: more advanced clusters might have better 
project performance in terms of milestones, and ultimately as hypothesized, greater 
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adoption. The reverse might also be true: less advanced clusters might focus more on 
meeting milestones and coordinating the project instead of on development and as a 
result have greater adoption despite their missed milestones.
In  addition,  differences  in  stages  of  development  among  clusters  might  have  played  a  role 
despite the fact that all GENI clusters were required to follow the Spiral method. ProtoGENI and 
PlanetLab seemed to be more advanced because their development was based on a pre-existing 
architecture (Emulab) whereas ORCA and ORBIT didn’t  not use Emulab as a starting point. 
However, as some interview respondents mentioned, ORBIT had a pre-existing design and a user 
base before GENI began, so that is a comparable starting point to ProtoGENI’s and PlanetLab’s.  
ORCA started out with a theoretical design concept and was less advanced than the other three 
clusters.
 It is possible in theory that less advanced clusters miss more milestones because their 
development teams might need additional time and resources to coordinate their development. It 
is also possible that more advanced clusters miss more milestones because their development 
teams might be less concerned with coordination matters and deadlines and instead focus more 
on extending, improving or integrating the technology once the initial development phase is over 
and there is a working prototype on which further extensions can be made. 
Past  studies  of  project  management  in  IT  teams  have  not  examined  technologies  at 
variable stages of development as an antecedent to adoption, but the stage of development can 
have indirect effects on adoption by influencing how much attention the team pays to milestones, 
through changes in the team’s membership and leadership, and changes in the expertise that’s 
required to complete the project. In GENI, all clusters reported consistently on their progress and 
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discussed  their  milestones  in  GEC meetings,  which  indicates  they  paid  similar  attention  to 
milestones. Changes in team membership and leadership occurred as new  developers joined a 
project – it is likely that some clusters experienced greater changes internally in their teams, and 
that might have affected their ability to meet milestones. This is a factor that was not measured in 
this  study  as  the  direct  effect  on  adoption  was  hypothesized  to  be  team  performance  on 
milestones  and  indirect  effects  such  as  team  membership  were  not  considered.  That  is  a 
limitation of the analysis and can be a basis for future studies on how team performance affects 
technology adoption.
With respect to the second hypothesis about social influence effects on dominance, this 
study only examine one of many mechanisms of social influence. To assess the impact of social  
influence on adoption in a complete manner more factors should be included in the analysis, such 
as word of mouth and any additional ways in which developers can communicate with adopters. 
This study considered only framing effects as those were measurable through the teams’ repeated 
presentations at conferences, as opposed to word of mouth which was not captured in GENI’s 
archives. Further studies can complement this analysis by including an examination of word of 
mouth effects through interviews and surveys of GENI’s adopters.
Another  limitation  of  this  study  is  that  data  on  the  independent  variables  were  not 
collected during Spiral Three, as the goal was to test the hypotheses over time across Spirals. 
Even  though  the  influence  of  the  independent  variables  on  adoption  and  dominance  within 
Spirals  One and Two was examined (no support was found for the project  performance and 
social influence hypotheses), it is possible that the data analysis during Spiral Three might have 
found support for either hypothesis.
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Finally, the goal of this study was to examine how development influences adoption, so 
projects external to GENI are not part of its development teams, but they might have an external 
impact  on  GENI’s  team dynamics  if  communication  or  any  type  of  collaboration  occurred 
among  them.  That  is  a  limitation  of  the  study  and  can  be  included  in  further  analysis  as 
exogenous variables that might affect adoption.
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10.0 CONCLUSION
As scientific work becomes more collaborative across all aspects of the scientific enterprise (e.g., 
discovery, experimentation, data collection, documentation, evaluation, reuse), the importance of 
cyber-infrastructure  systems  in  supporting  and  transforming  scientific  practice  will  increase, 
along with their becoming an integral part of scientific work.  Cyber-infrastructure isn’t a stand-
alone technology but a platform (Baldwin and Clark 2000, Whitney et al  2004) that mediates 
and structures the interactions of users engaged in collaborative research, data sharing and data 
reuse. Selection or emergence of a dominant architecture for a CI system has implications not 
only for what software peripherals can be included in it but also for how data sharing, reuse and 
collaborative research will  take place through the CI.  The embeddedness of such systems in 
scientific  collaboration  and in  institutional  (university)  policies,  along with their  large  scale, 
increase both the risk of failure in their development and deployment, and the opportunities they 
can provide for collaboration across disciplinary and institutional boundaries. For those reasons 
the  emergence  or  selection  of  a  “dominant”  design  or  underlying  architecture  for  cyber-
infrastructure systems has both practical and research implications beyond what can be inferred 
from studies of less complex end-user technologies. 
The goal of this study was to examine the process by which a dominant design emerges 
for a CI system. The findings can make theoretical contributions to the research stream of IT 
adoption, and in particular, to studies of how the adoption of large-scale systems is influenced by 
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actions and decisions of the system’s stakeholders while the system is still under development. 
More specific contributions can be made through the empirical testing of  organizational path 
dependence  theory  and  to  research  on  technological  frames  and  social  influence  with  the 
examination of how the framing of CI technologies influences their adoption. Findings regarding 
the impact  of project performance on adoption can be useful to managers and developers of 
large-scale  system development  projects  and  to  funding  agencies  supporting  those  projects. 
While findings are tentative and inconclusive,  they can be a starting point for examining the 
emergence  of  dominant  designs  for  large-scale  systems  and  the  processes  influencing  their 
adoption over time. Future studies can extend this research stream by examining the role of early 
and ongoing history in the adoption of different kinds of large-scale systems, and how specific 
design decisions and project  management  approaches  might  affect  the system’s  development 
trajectory.
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